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INTERNATIONAL UNION,
UNITED MiNE WORKERS V. BAGWELL:
A PARADIGM SHIFT IN THE DISTINCTION
BETWEEN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
INTRODUCTION

The distinction between civil and criminal contempt has proved
to be notoriously difficult for courts to apply1 and has been roundly
criticized by scholarly commentators.2 Although there has been a
consensus on the conceptual basis for the distinction,3 its application
has yielded little but confusion and inconsistency. The uncertainty
resulting from attempts to distinguish civil from criminal contempt is
particularly troubling in light of the fact that, apart from judicial selfdiscipline, the classification of contempts has been virtually the sole
means of constraining the contempt power.4 Because a court's classification of a contempt determines the extent to which procedural due
process protects an accused contemnor, the distinction is of vital concern: it is practically the sole bulwark against biased use of the virtually unlimited contempt power.5 The development of procedural
protections for criminal contempt has failed to provide an adequate
check on the contempt power because the Court's overly conceptual
approach to distinguishing contempts has invited confusion and created the potential for manipulation and abuse. 6 By virtue of the labile
1 Courts themselves frequently allude to the difficulty of this enterprise. See, e.g.,
Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911) ("Contempts are neither
wholly civil nor altogether criminal."); Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 329
(1904) ("It may not always be easy to classify a particular act as belonging to either one of
these two classes. It may partake of the characteristics of both."); United States v. Rylander,
714 F.2d 996, 998 (9th Cir. 1983) ("Courts frequently have difficulty distinguishing between civil and criminal contempt."), cert. denieA 467 U.S. 1209 (1984); United States v.
Powers, 629 F.2d 619, 626 (9th Cir. 1980) (venturing, with understatement bordering on
litotes, that "confusion is not uncommon").
2 See, e.g., Rota.D GoULFARB, THE CoNTEMPT Pows-t 49 (1963) ("Nowhere else is
there such recurring confusion and mistake as [in the classification of contempts]."); Dan
B. Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 245 (1971) ("The confusion
surrounding the criminal/civil distinction is an unfortunate one, and costly as well ....
[T]he effort by reviewing courts to label the case as a criminal or as a civil one is often an
exercise in futility."); Earl C. Dudley, Jr., GettingBeyond the Civil/CriminalDistinction:A New
Approach to the Regulation of Indirect Contempts, 79 VA. L. REv. 1025, 1033 (1993) ("[The
distinction has become a major source of the confusion that is endemic to the contempt
process.").
3 See Dobbs, supra note 2, at 235, 239.
4 See Dudley, supra note 2, at 1034.
5 See id at 1026-27.
6 See Dobbs, supra note 2 at 185 ("[O]ur system [of classifying contempts] has few
doctrines precise enough to permit adequate control of immoderate impulses."); Dudley,
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nature of the civil-criminal distinction, and its tendency to be employed as a post-hoc rationalization for trial courts' actions, courts
have been able to avoid these procedural protections by labeling con7
tempt sanctions as civil.

Until its recent decision in InternationalUnion, UnitedMine Workers
v. Bagwell,s the Supreme Court failed to move beyond an abstract and
ultimately unworkable formula for classifying contempts. In Bagwell,
the Court held that violations of complex injunctions occurring out of
court are to be treated as criminal contempts, subject to federal criminal procedure. In doing so, the Court shifted its analysis from a formalistic jurisprudence of labels to one that addresses the due process
rights of contemnors and the problems inherent in the contempt
power.
This Note analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in Bagwell in a
historical context. Part I outlines the history and broad contours of
contempt doctrine and sets forth the rule-of-law concerns raised by
the contempt power. Part II discusses the Supreme Court's articulation of standards for distinguishing between the two types of contempt and the differing approaches taken by the lower federal courts
in their application of these standards, with particular emphasis on
their treatment of fines levied for violations of injunctions. 9 Part II
concludes with a preliminary analysis of the state of the law in this
area. Part III sets forth the facts of the Bagwell case, summarizes the
opinions below, and discusses the Supreme Court's treatment of the
case. Part III goes on to analyze the case's holding in light of the
difficulties presented by the Court's civil-criminal contempt jurisprudence and assesses how well the opinion addresses the rule-of-law concerns raised by the contempt power. Part III concludes that Bagwell
represents a paradigm shift10 in the Court's approach to the distincsuPranote 2, at 1032-33 ("[T]he civil/criminal distinction, while a significant advance in
curbing abuses, is not ultimately a satisfactory means of regulating the power of courts to
sanction indirect contempts.").
7
See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 208 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting) (Civil
contempt "has become a common device for by-passing the constitutionally prescribed
safeguards of the regular criminal law in punishing public wrongs.").
8 114 S. Ct. 2552 (1994).
9 Because the distinction between civil and criminal contempts is a question of federal law, Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 630 (1988), this Note confines its
analysis to cases from the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts.
10 By invoking the term "paradigm shift," this Note adopts the approach to intellectual historiography developed by Thomas Kuhn in his influential work, The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn argued that science does not progress in an even, linear fashion; instead, the scientific community develops an explanatory paradigm to which all in
the community acquiesce. This acquiescence, which Kuhn terms "normal science," continues until independent research uncovers enough anomalies-phenomena that cannot be
explained by the dominant paradigm-to unsettle the reigning consensus. See THOMAS S.
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SciENTIrc REVOLUTIONS passim (1970). This mode of analysis is
particularly appropriate for tracing common-law development, as Kuhn himself noted in
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tion between civil and criminal contempt. Within the ambit of the
case's holding, the Court has moved from the abstract to the operational; the Court's methodology in Bagwell pays due regard to the interests at stake in contempt proceedings and addresses the
developments in the nature of adjudication that make the received
paradigm anachronistic. Part IV suggests the possibility that the analysis the Court used in Bagwell be applied to other contempt contexts as
well, thereby rationalizing the law of contempt.
I
AN OUTLINE OF THE LAW OF CONTEMPT

A.

Overview of the Principal Contempt Distinctions

Scholars and judges have generally agreed that the conceptual
distinction between civil and criminal contempt is based on the purposes to be served by the sanction." Civil contempt sanctions can be
employed for "remedial" or "coercive" ends.' 2 Remedial contempt
sanctions fit comfortably with traditional notions of civil relief. Such
sanctions are intended to be compensatory, to make whole the party
aggrieved by the contemnor's conduct.'3 Accordingly, in remedial
contempt cases, a court levies a fine keyed to a determination of the
14
aggrieved party's damages and payable to that party.
The analogy between coercive civil sanctions and traditional civil
remedies is more attenuated. Coercive contempt sanctions are
designed to compel obedience to a court's order.' 5 Typically, the
sanction for disobedience is imprisonment until the contemnor complies with the order.1 6 Thus in civil contempt cases, imprisonment is
for an indefinite term; in such cases, according to the overly worn saw,
civil contemnors are said to "carry the keys to their prison in their own
pockets."'1 7 Civil contempts can also be sanctioned by fines; in United
his discussion of "normal science": "[L]ike an acceptedjudicial decision in the common
law, [a paradigm] is an object for further articulation and speculation under new or more
stringent conditions." Id. at 23.
11

3 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT,FEDERAL PRAcTIcE AND PROCEDURE § 704, at 823-24 (2d ed.

1982).
See Dobbs, supra note 2, at 285.
Id.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 825, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 430 F.2d 1225, 1229
(3d Cir. 1970) (civil fine to compensate complaining party for losses is appropriate contempt remedy), cert. deniA, 401 U.S. 976 (1971); Yanish v. Barber, 232 F.2d 939, 944 (9th
Cir. 1956) (civil fine payable to the complainant can be levied against contemnor, provided that the fine is based upon evidence of damage).
15 See Dobbs, supra note 2, at 235.
16 See United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 2557 (1994) (describing incar12

'3
14

ceration conditioned on compliance as "[the paradigmatic coercive, civil contempt
sanction").

17 In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902). This rationale has been justy condemned in the literature. See, e.g., GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 59-61 (criticizing the keys-to-
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States v. United Mine Workers,' 8 the Supreme Court authorized the use
of fines as coercive remedies for a party's disobedience of an injunction. This technique has since become relatively common.' 9
With a few notable exceptions, the procedures for civil contempt
are the same as those that apply to civil actions in general. The alleged contemnor must be given notice of charges and an opportunity
to be heard.2 0 In federal courts, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
control the proceedings. 2 ' Unlike most civil actions, however, civil
contempt must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, 22 and,
23
most importantly, the civil contemnor has no right to a jury trial.
Civil contemptjudgments are not appealable until a final judgment in
the underlying action is entered.2 4
Although there is ordinarily no limit to a court's civil sanctioning
authority,25 three rules peculiar to coercive contempt sanctions prothe-prison rationale as an unrealistic legal clich6). Because of the limitless and openended nature of coercive sanctions, coercive contempt can be extremely harsh, particularly
for those whose disobedience is predicated on ethical or religious principles, or a desire to
protect either themselves (as in the case of wimesses in organized crime prosecutions) or
third parties (as illustrated by the Morgan case discussed below). See Linda S. Beres, Civil
Contempt and the Rational Contemnor,69 IND. LJ. 723, 731-32 (1994). The notorious case of
Morgan v. Foretich, 564 A.2d 1 (D.C. Ct. App. 1989), illustrates the fatuousness of the keysto-the-prison adage. In Morgan, a Washington, D.C. Superior Court judge, Herbert Dixon,
ordered Dr. Elizabeth Morgan imprisoned for refusing to allow her ex-husband to visit
their daughter as ordered. Id. at 2. Dr. Morgan believed that her ex-husband had sexually
assaulted their daughter and thus refused to allow visitation to protect the child. Id. After
16 months in prison, Judge Dixon stated that "coercion had just begun." Id. at 9. After
nearly two years in prison, the appellate court ordered Dr. Morgan released on the ground
that the imprisonment had ceased to be coercive. Id. at 2. In a further twist, the appeals
court, sua sponte, voted to rehear the case en banc and accordingly vacated the release
order. Id. at 20. Before rehearing, however, Congress passed the District of Columbia Civil
Contempt Imprisonment Limitation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-97, 103 Stat. 633 (codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-944 (Supp. 1990)), requiring release under the circumstances
of the case, and the appellate court remanded to the trial court with instructions to order
Dr. Morgan's release. Id. at 21; see also Beres, supra at 729 n.46. On remand, the trial
court, absent Judge Dixon, ordered her release, but by this time, Dr. Morgan had spent
more than two years in prison. See Barton Gellman, ElizabethMorgan FreedAfter 759 Deys in
Jai, WASH. PosT, Sept. 26, 1989, at Al. For thoughtful discussion of the predicament faced
by many parents who fear for their children's safety when a court orders custody and visitation rights, see Melinda L. Moseley, Comment, Civil Contempt and Child Sexual Abuse Allegations: A Modem Solomon's Choice, 40 EMORY LJ. 203 (1991).
18 330 U.S. 258 (1946).
19 See infra Part lI.B.
20 Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 440 (1932).
21 WRIGHT, supra note 11, § 705, at 829.
22 Id. at 830.
23 Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966).
24
See IBM v. United States, 493 F.2d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995
(1974).
25 The Eighth Amendment's prohibitions on excessive fines and cruel and unusual
punishment, although applicable to criminal contempt, do not apply to civil contempt
sanctions. Spallone v. United States, 487 U.S. 1251, 1257 (1988) (coercive fine); Ingraham
v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667-78 (1977) (coercive imprisonment). A nebulous limiting prin-
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vide some check on this power. First, if the underlying controversy
giving rise to a civil contempt action is settled or is otherwise terminated, the contempt proceeding becomes moot, and the sanctions
must end. 26 Second, a coercive civil sanction cannot continue once it

has become impossible for the contemnor to comply.2 7 Third, if it
becomes clear that a court's efforts to compel compliance are ineffectual, the sanction becomes punitive and thus can no longer be considered civil.

28

The purpose of criminal contempt is avowedly punitive; criminal
contempt is a public wrong and is punished in order to vindicate the
court's authority.2 9 Criminal contempts can be punished by fines or
imprisonment. In contrast to the open-ended sentencing characteristic of civil contempt cases, however, a criminal contempt sentence is
determinate.3 0 With the exception of "petty direct contempts," criminal contempts now warrant almost all of the procedural protections
afforded by the Constitution: the right to a jury trial; 3 1 the rights to
notice of charges and assistance of counsel;32 the privilege against selfincrimination; and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.3 3 Notably, however, the criminal contemnor has no right to a

grand jury indictment,3 4 and, as Professor Dudley points out, the protection against double jeopardy "applies at best in a watered-down
35
fashion."
Another important distinction in contempt doctrine is that between "direct" and "indirect" contempts. Direct contempts are "those
which are committed within the presence of the court... or so near
ciple can be found in Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 230-31 (1821), a contempt-of-Congress case in which the Court stated, in dictum, that the contempt power
should be limited to "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed." Although
this principle has been "elevated ...to the status of a general standard," it is too vague to
serve the immense task assigned it. See Dudley, supra note 2, at 1060.
26 Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 452 (1911).
27 Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966).
28
WRIM-rr, supra note 11, § 704, at 828-29 (citing cases). As Professor Dudley notes,
however, "[t]he question of when a coercive sanction has lost its potential effect ...is one
of exquisite complexity." Dudley, supra note 2, at 1054 n.1 13. Indeed, as the Morgan case,
discussed supra note 17, demonstrates, such relief as this difficult rule offers can be quite
belated.
29
WIUGrr, supra note 11, § 704, at 824-25 (citing cases).
30 See Dobbs, supra note 2, at 237.
31 Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
32
Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925).
33 Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911).
34 Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 165, 185 (1958).
35 Dudley, supra note 2, at 1073 n.190. In Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 74
(1957), the Court held that the prohibition against doublejeopardy is not offended simply
because a court can impose both civil and criminal sanctions for a particular act The
Second Circuit, in United States v. Hughey, 571 F.2d 111, 114-15 (2d Cir. 1978), read Yates
to authorize an individual's imprisonment for criminal contempt despite his or her earlier
coercive imprisonment for the same conduct.
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to the court as to interrupt its proceedings."3 6 Conversely, indirect
contempts "embrace all contemnous acts which do not take place in
the presence of the court, and of which the court itself has no
37
knowledge."
Historically, direct contempts have been punished by summary
procedures while indirect contempts have required a greater degree
of procedural protection.3 8 The modem American law of contempt
has preserved this distinction although it has limited the use of the
summary contempt power. Rule 42 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allows summary punishment only for contempts in the
actual presence of the court. The Supreme Court has further limited
the use of summary contempt powers by requiring that "serious" criminal contempts be tried by jury; accordingly, use of the summary contempt power is confined to cases of direct "petty" contempt.3 9
B. A Brief History of the Contempt Power
The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the
4°
brain of the living.
-Karl Marx
1.

History's Long Shadow

The inherent power of common-law courts to punish disobedience and affronts to their authority is an ancient one. In a pathbreaking treatise on contempt, SirJohn Fox traced contempt in English law
to the twelfth century4 ' and found the principles of contempt doctrine "firmly established" by the fourteenth century. 42
The early English courts represented the king, and thus contempt of court was, by extension, contempt of the king.43 As Professor
36

STEWART RAPALJE, A TREATIsE ON CONTEMPT 26 (1884).

37

CROMWELL H. THOMAS, PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 3 (1934).

38 See infra note 175.
39 Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 209-10 (1968). The Court did not set the "dividing
line" between petty and serious offenses for another six years; in Codispoti v. Pennsylvania,
418 U.S. 506, 512 (1974), the Court announced that "those crimes carrying a sentence of

more than six months are serious crimes and those carrying a sentence of six months or
less are petty crimes." The Court has drawn no such line with regard to fines. Compare
Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975) ($10,000 fine against union not serious) with
Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 595 (1947) (determinate fine of $50 triggers heightened
procedures). The Bagwell decision left this question open. International Union, United
Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 2562 n.5 (1994).
40
KARL MARX, THE EIGHTEENTH BRuMAuxE OF Louis BONAPARTE 15 (International
Publishers 1963).
41

SIRJOHN Fox, THE HISToRY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT. THE FORM OF TRIAL AND THE

MODE OF PUNISHMENT 46 (1927).
42 Id. at 1.
43 GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 12.
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Goldfarb aptly put it: "Though the king acted through others, in a
mystical way he was presumed to be present and subject to being contemned."4 With no constraints on the power to punish, retribution
was often severe, if not brutal. Contemnors were often imprisoned
indefinitely "to abide the King's will,"4 5 and dismemberment, dispossession, and execution of contemnors were not unknown to the com46
mon law.

The early history of the contempt power sheds light on an important, lasting feature of the law of contempt. The power to punish contemnors was assumed by a judiciary whose authority was coextensive
with that of the monarch. Accordingly, the contempt power was, and
to a great extent still is, exercised without any external constraints.
Although in the political sphere, England and the United States had
moved away from absolutism by the eighteenth century, judges in the
common-law countries remained to some degree clothed in the robes
of royal prerogative. The image of Bobby Seale bound and gagged in
federal court47 testifies to the fact that archaic measures deployed in
44
45

Id.
See, e.g., Y.B. 30 Edw. 3, pl. 19 (1356), quoted in Fox, supra note 41, app. at 237

(Defendant who called judge a traitor was "found guilty [of contempt of the king] and
imprisoned to abide the King's will."); Sir William Waller's Case, Y.B. 9 Charles 1 (1633),
quoted in Fox, supra note 41, at 241 (Defendant indicted for assault in the Palace of Westminster was sentenced to "imprisonment during the King's pleasure, fine of £1,000 and
binding to good behavior.").
46 See, e.g., Anon. Y.B. 19 Edw. 452 (1345), quoted in Fox, supra note 41, app. at 235-36
(For threatening and striking jurors, the court "gives judgment that the offender's right
hand be struck off and his land and chattels forfeited and that he be imprisoned for life;
but execution is afterwards stayed until the King has signified his pleasure."); Y.B. 22 Edw.
13, pl. 26 (1348), quoted in Fox, supra note 41, app. at 236. In this case, "[a] Knight and an
Esquire [were] indicted for raising strife before Thorpe, C.J." Id. For attempting to rescue
a defendant, the Knight and Esquire were both disinherited, and the Esquire's hand was
cut off. The original defendant was "disinherited and sentenced to perpetual imprisonment." Id. Goldfarb recounted a 17th Century case in which "a man threw a brickbat at
the ChiefJustice after being convicted of a felony. Though he missed the judge, his right
hand was cut off and fixed to the gibbet, and he was immediately hanged in the presence
of the court." GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 15.
47 See United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, app. 381-88 (1972), for an excerpt from
the Chicago 8 trial record chronicling Judge Hoffman's order that federal marshals gag
Seale and bind him to his chair. The 16 contempt citations thatJudge Hoffinan imposed
on Seale were reversed on appeal. Id. at 371-73. The Supreme Court provided the authority for such physically intrusive measures in the still-vigorous case of Illinois v. Allen, 397
U.S. 337 (1970):
It is essential to the proper administration of criminal justice that dignity,
order, and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings in our country.... We believe trial judges confronted with disruptive, contumacious,

stubbornly defiant defendants must be given sufficient discretion to meet
the circumstances of each case.... We think there are at least three constitutionally permissible ways for a trial judge to handle an obstreperous defendant like Allen: (1) bind and gag him, thereby keeping him present; (2)
cite him for contempt; (3) take him out of the courtroom until he promises
to conduct himself properly.
Id. at 343-44.
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the name of orderly proceedings have survived into the twentieth
century.
Because of the historical connection between judicial power and
royal prerogative, and the consequent creation of contempt by the
Royal Courts rather than by Act of Parliament, contempt has remained almost exclusively a concern of the judiciary, policed only by
the judiciary itself.48 Thus the judiciary has come to view contempt as
an inherent power of the courts, neither dependent on, nor bounded
by, any extramural legal norms.
Blackstone, and generations of jurists following him, maintained
that all contempts were tried summarily at common law. According to
Blackstone, judicial power to punish contempt "by an immediate attachment of the offender results from the first principles of judicial
establishments and must be an inseparable attendant upon every superior tribunal."4 9 This assumption, however, was soundly refuted by
the British scholar SirJohn Fox who marshalled a wealth of authority,
dating back to the thirteenth century, for the proposition that historically only direct contempts were punished by summary process; those
contempts occurring outside of the court's presence were tried by a
jury at law.50 Fox argued that Blackstone's view was based solely on
Justice Wilmot's undelivered opinion in The King v. Almon. 51 Whether
based on incomplete scholarship or prescriptive impulse, 52 this view
nonetheless proved influential. From the time of Blackstone through
the early twentieth century, courts in both Britain and the United
States routinely used summary process for both kinds of contempt.5
This practice, which is still the rule in Great Britain, 54 was not significantly curtailed in the United States until 1968 when the Supreme
Court granted jury trials for "serious" criminal contempts in Bloom v.
Illinois.55
48 See Dobbs, supra note 2, at 185 ("The law of contempt is largelyjudge-made law.");
Dudley, supra note 2, at 1045-46 ("[C]ontempt... [is] a process largely internal to the
judicial branch and wholly lacking in meaningful constraints.").
49
4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND 282.
50 Fox supra note 41, at 49-55; accord Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 202-04
(1958) (Black, J. dissenting); Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, Power of Congress Over
Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior"FederalCourts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37
HAnv. L. Rv.1010, 1042-46 (1924).
51
Fox, supra note 41, at 18-21; accord Green, 356 U.S. at 211 (Black, J., dissenting)
("Blackstone in his Commentaries incorporated Wilmot's erroneous fancy that at common
law the courts had immemorially punished all criminal contempts without regular trial.");
Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 50.
52 For a view of Blackstone's Commentariesas tendentious apologetics rather than empirical exposition, see generally Duncan Kennedy, The Structureof Blackstone's Commentaries,
28 BuFF. L. REv. 209 (1979).
53 See Fox, supra note 41, at 16-33, 202-26.
54 See CHRISTOPHERJ. MILLER, CONTEMPT OF COURT 5 (1989).
55
391 U.S. 194 (1968).
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The judicial contempt power came to the United States with the
common-law system. 5 6 The Judiciary Act of 1789, which created the
lower federal courts, was the first federal statute recognizing the contempt power. 57 Section seventeen of the Judiciary Act states that the
federal courts "shall have power.., to punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts, all contempts of authority in any
cause or hearing before the same."5 8 The Court has read the statute
to do no more than acknowledge courts' historical common-law
power. Recalling the image of Athena springing forth fully armed
from the head of Zeus, Chief Justice Field stated:
The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the... due administration ofjustice. The moment the
courts of the United States were called into existence and invested
with jurisdiction over any subject, they became possessed of this
59
power.
Congress has seen fit to allow the judiciary to keep contempt within
the judicial bailiwick. Congress's first, and practically sole, effort to
constrain the contempt power came in 1831, with the passage of a bill
intended to limit federal courts' power to punish contempt by publication; this statute survives as the general federal contempt statute, 18
U.S.C. § 401.60
56 SeeExparte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925) (holding that presidential pardon vacates
criminal contemptjudgment because at common law, such punishment was for contempt
of the king, but opining in dictum that a pardon cannot so operate with regard to civil
contempt). In Grossman, ChiefJustice Taft offered a classic explanation of the importation
of the English common law into the Constitution:
The language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted safely except by
reference to the common law and to British institutions as they were when
the instrument was framed and adopted. The statesmen and lawyers of the
Convention ... were born and brought up in the atmosphere of the common law and thought and spoke in its vocabulary ... [W]hen they came to
put their conclusions into the form of fundamental law in a compact draft,
they expressed them in terms of the common law, confident that they could
be shortly and easily understood.
Id.at 107-08. But see Green v. United States, 865 U.S. 165, 210 (1958) (BlackJ, dissenting)
("Those who formed the Constitution struck out anew free of previous shackles in an effort
to obtain a better order of government more congenial to human liberty and welfare. It
cannot be seriously claimed that they intended to adopt the common law wholesale.").
57 Judiciary Act of 1789, § 17, 1 Stat. 83.
58 Id.
59 ExparteRobinson, 86 U.S. 505, 510 (1873); see also Green v. United States, 356 U.S.
165, 169 (1958) (Judiciary Act is merely declarative of common law.).
60 See Dudley, supranote 2, at 1034 n.32. The statute reads:
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or
imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none
other, as(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as
to obstruct the administration ofjustice;
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers...
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Informed by the contempt power's royal origins, the view that it is
"inherent" and "necessary" has served to keep contempt doctrinally
detached from ordinary procedures. In 1925, the Supreme Court
bluntly expressed the view that contempt is unique and thus not subject to the usual constitutionally mandated process constraints: "Contempt proceedings are sui generis because they are not hedged about
with all the safeguards provided in the bill of rights for protecting one
61
accused of ordinary crime from the danger of unjust conviction."
This view persisted through the first half of this century. In Green v.
United States, the Court stated that the cases "establish[ed] beyond peradventure that criminal contempts are not subject to jury trial as a
62
matter of Constitutional right."
The Supreme Court eventually ameliorated this stark and absolutist view, but only with respect to criminal contempts. Through a
gradual process, akin to that by which the Court applied federal criminal procedures to the states by incorporating the Bill of Rights' protections into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, the
Supreme Court has required that criminal contempt proceedings be
conducted with many of the procedural protections afforded criminal
defendants. 63 Although the Court began this process as early as 1911,
when it extended the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to criminal contempt proceedings, 64 it was not until the late
1960s that the Court was willing to grant alleged criminal contemnors
jury trials and consider criminal contempt to be a "crime in the ordi(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule,
decree, or command.
18 U.S.C. § 401 (1994). Congress's other forays into the realm of limiting the contempt
power were limited ones. See id. § 402 (limiting fines for contempts that are also crimes to
$1,000); id. § 1509 (limiting fines for obstruction of court orders to $1,000); id. § 3691
(guaranteeing jury trials for indirect contempts that are also crimes). Only §§ 402 and
3691 apply in state as well as federal courts.
61 Exparte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 117 (1925). This passage is notable for its circularity; because contempt is not "hedged about" by the Constitution, it is sui generis. Nowhere
did the Court explain how it is that the contempt power evaded such hedging ab initio.
Thus the contempt power has remain mystified. Cromwell Thomas acerbically commented that "the members of the judiciary have been so well pleased with their summary
powers that they seem never to have undertaken a searching investigation into the history
of the contempt power." THOMAS, supra note 37, at 5.
62
356 U.S. 165, 183 (1954).
63
See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) (trial byjury); Cooke v. United States, 267
U.S. 517, 537 (1925) (notice of charges and assistance of counsel); Gompers v. Buck's
Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911) (privilege against self-incrimination and right
to proof beyond a reasonable doubt). Despite the Court's (belated) insistence that criminal contempt is a "crime in the ordinary sense," Bloom, 391 U.S. at 201, and that the question of what procedures are appropriate in contempt proceedings is a question of federal
law, Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 630 (1988), the Court has not required
grand jury indictments in criminal contempt proceedings. See Green, 356 U.S. at 183-87.
64 Gompers, 221 U.S. at 444.
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nary sense." 65 With this development, the distinction between civil
and criminal contempt assumed a new importance- it became the
means by which the Court allocated constitutional protections.
2.

Two Modern Contempt Arenas

Contempt has played a particularly prominent role in two contexts: labor disputes and public law litigation. In these two arenas,
issues concerning the procedural protections to be afforded contemnors, and even the legitimacy of the contempt power itself and the
underlying equity powers of the courts, have assumed particular
urgency.
No history of contempt in the United States can be complete
without reference to its intersection with organized labor, for the law
of contempt was, and remains, deeply imbricated with the history of
the American labor movement. Labor has both shaped and been
shaped by the law of contempt.
From the late nineteenth century until the passage of the NorrisLaGuardia Act 66 in 1932, contempt, in conjunction with the federal
district courts' equitable power to grant injunctive relief, provided
management and a complaisant federal judiciary with a potent
weapon against organized labor. During this period, decried as the
era of "government by injunction," 67 federal (and state) courts regularly policed labor disputes by issuing injunctions and subsequently
68
enforcing them via contempt proceedings.
65 Bloom, 391 U.S. at 201.
66 47 Stat. 72 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1988)). Section four of the statute
expressly denied the federal courts jurisdiction to issue temporary restraining orders or
injunctions forbidding strike activity "in a case involving or growing out of labor dispute."
29 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). It is worth noting that this was Congress's second attempt to rein
in the federal courts. Its first effort, the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, § 20 (1914) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1994)), was frustrated by the Supreme Court's decision in
Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921) (effectively nullifying Congress's effort to exempt labor organizations from antitrust prohibitions and reading the Clayton
Act's anti-labor-injunction provisions to apply only to "lawful" concerted activity by those in
a proximate employer-employee relationship).
67 See FELrXJ. FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 1 (1930).
68 In 1929, Frankfurter and Greene wrote:
Of the reported cases in the federal courts since 1901, there were one hundred and eighteen applications for injunctive relief, of which one hundred
were successful. But this affords no index of the extent of such equitable
intervention. For only decrees that are challenged by motions for discontinuance, on appeal or through contempt proceedings, normally find their
way into the reports.... We know enough to know that the unreported
proceedings must be voluminous.
Id. at 49-50. William Forbath and Craig Becker reported that from 1880 to 1930, federal
and state courts issued some 4,300 antistrike orders. William E. Forbath & Craig Becker,
Labor, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT 490 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992).
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The federal courts' liberal use of the injunctive decree, backed by
the contempt power, proved devastating to labor's efforts to organize
and take collective action throughout the first half of this century:
courts' issuance of strike- and boycott-enjoining orders often resulted
in broken unions. 69 Accordingly, issues concerning prosecution of
contempt for violations of injunctions have been of especially vital interest to organized labor. Labor leader Eugene V. Debs argued to the
Supreme Court for the right to a jury trial in criminal contempt proceedings more than seventy years before the Court recognized the
right.70 Labor's interest in this area has not abated, particularly since
71
the Supreme Court, in Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks' Local 770,
took much of the force out of the anti-injunction provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, thereby putting the federal courts back into the
business of enjoining strikes. Furthermore, as the Bagwell case itself
demonstrates, sweeping labor injunctions are not a thing of the past.
Given labor's interest in contempt issues, and the fact that many of
the Court's most important contempt rulings concern labor disputes,
it is fitting that the Bagwell case, guaranteeing alleged contemnors the
procedural protections of the criminal law when alleged violations of
complex injunctions are at issue, itself arose out of a labor dispute.
Although labor has had an especially acute interest in ensuring
fairness and impartiality in contempt proceedings, such issues are of
69 The famous Pullman strike of 1894 provides a striking example (no pun intended).
After George Pullman rebuffed workers' demands to discuss a 25-40% pay cut, the American Railway Union, led by Eugene V. Debs, called for a strike and boycott of the Pullman
Company. 2 AMERICAN SOCIAL HISTORY PROJECT, WHO BUILT AMERICA? 141 (1992). An
estimated 260,000 workers united in the action, which succeeded in "bringing most of the
nation's rail traffic to a halt." Id. at 141-42. A railroad managers' association then enlisted
the aid of the federal government. Id. at 142. Thereupon, Attorney General Richard C.
Olney (a former railroad lawyer) took what Felix Frankfurter called "the extraordinary
step" of "direct[ing] the United States Attorney in Chicago to apply to the United States
Court for a writ of injunction." FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supranote 67, at 18. The district
court then issued a "sweeping injunction ... effectively outlawing the boycott." AMERICAN
SOCIAL HISTORY PROJECT, supra; at 142. Federal and state troops were deployed against the
strikers, and Debs was imprisoned for contempt of the injunction. Id. at 142. Consequently, the strike, and with it the American Railroad Union, were broken. As Debs himself put it in testimony before the United States Strike Commission: "[T]he ranks were
broken, and the strike was broken up ... not by the army, and not by any other power, but
simply and solely by the action of the United States Courts in restraining us from discharging our duties as officers and representatives of the employees." United States Strike Commission, Report on the Chicago Strike of June-July 1894, 143-44 (1895) (testimony of
Eugene Debs), quoted in FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supranote 67, at 17.
70 See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895) (rejecting Debs's argument that his criminal
contempt conviction should have been tried before a jury). The Debs holding against the
right to ajury trial in criminal contempt proceedings was not rejected until 1968 in Bloom
v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
71 398 U.S. 235 (1970) (holding that, despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act and former
Supreme Court precedent, federal courts can issue injunctions against strikes if the strike is
in contravention of a no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement with arbitration
provisions).
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great general concern as well. Contempt proceedings can arise in a
dizzying array of contexts, from child support proceedings 72 to systemic reform litigation. 7 3 In the words of a major commentator,
"Contempt is the Proteus of the legal world, assuming an almost infinite diversity of forms."74 Since the 1960s, contempt has become increasingly important in what has come to be known as "public law" or
"structural reform" litigation. 75 Such litigation, typified by school desegregation or prison reform actions, 76 aims at systemic reform, places
judges in a long-term supervisory role, and relies heavily on the
courts' equity powers.7 7 Accordingly, contempt sanctions, or at least
the threat thereof, have assumed importance in the enforcement of
the complex injunctions and consent decrees generated by this form
of litigation. 78
The near-ubiquity of the contempt power, as well as its use
against labor and in furtherance of structural reform efforts, make the
question of the process that a contemnor is due an urgent one. Furthermore, the serious issues that contempt raises with regard to the
principle of legality and the separation of powers makes contempt a
locus of disquiet for anyone concerned with the rule of law. The following section discusses these considerations.
C.

Contempt and the Rule of Law

[Contempt] is not to be made an offence on arguments drawnfrom necessity,
unless the law has made it so. Powerwas ever silently stealingits way along
that path. It was first necessary-then inherent-then implied-then expedient-then adopted-then demonstrated on precedent as well as p1nci72

See, e.g., Hicks ex rel Feiock v. Feiock 485 U.S. 624, 630 (1988).

73

See OwEN FIss & DOUG RENDLEMAN, INJUNCrIONS 528-30 (2d ed. 1984).

74 Joseph Moskovitz, Contempt ofinjunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 780,
781 (1943).
75 The former term was coined by Abram Chayes; the latter bears the stamp of Owen
Fiss. See Abram Chayes, The Role of theJudge in PublicLaw Litigation,89 HARv. L. REv. 1281
(1976); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms ofJusti4 93 HARv.
L. Rav. 1 (1979).
76

See Fiss & RENDLEMAN, supra note 73, at 528.

77 See System Fed'n No. 91, Ry. Employees' Dep't v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647 (1961)
("An injunction often requires continuing supervision by the issuing court.... ."); Chayes,
supra note 75, at 1292-93.
78 See, e.g., United States v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1988) (affirming

coercive contempt sanctions against municipality for violation of consent decree obligating
city to remedy its highly segregated housing), cert. denied,489 U.S. 1065 (1989); Little Rock
Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 839 F.2d 1296 (8th Cir. 1988) (af-

firming civil contempt sanctions against school district for failure to comply fully with desegregation order), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 869 (1988); Ruiz v. McCotter, 661 F. Supp. 112

(S.D. Tex. 1986) (finding Texas Department of Corrections in civil contempt for its failure
to comply with single-celling order in timely manner).
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pie-and finally established, defended and learnedly and eloquently
79
vindicated.
-Henry Storrs
The rule of law is a central concept in the Western political-legal
tradition.8 0 This ideal, summed up by Justice John Marshall's statement that ours is "a government of laws, and not of men,"8 ' is based
on the notion that the enactment of rules by a legislature will prevent
the exercise of arbitrary power. Britain and the United States are two
nations with the self-image as exemplars of the rule of law; yet in both
countries, the judicial contempt power, at considerable odds with the
rule of law, is considered necessary and inherent.
In his celebrated commentary on the English Constitution, A.V.
Dicey advanced, as a cardinal principle of the rule of law, the notion
that the citizen should not be subject to the exercise of arbitrary
power; accordingly, under a rule-of-law system, a citizen should be
82
punished only for violations of predetermined and bounded law.
Insofar as Anglo-American legal culture can be identified with Dicey's
concepts, the commentator who described the contempt power as a
"jurisdiction . .. foreign to the whole spirit of Anglo-American jurisprudence"88 was not indulging in dramatic overstatement. Indeed,
the existence of ajudicial contempt power runs counter to two related
features of rule-of-law systems: the principle of legality and the separation of powers.
The principle of legality "is widely recognized as the cornerstone
of the penal law."8 4 This principle, summed up in the maxim nulla
85
It
poena sine lege, laid to rest the creation of common-law crimes.
involves two precepts: first, crimes should only be defined by the legis79

ARTHUR STANSBURY, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF JAmES H. PECK 402 (1833).

80

See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN

LEGAL TRADITION 292-94 (1983) (tracing the rule-of-law ideal back to the 13th Century).
Although the rule of law is usually associated with, and invoked by, those who embrace the
classical liberal or modem conservative tradition, see, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as
a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. Ra. 1175 (1989), it can have salience for those in the radical
political tradition as well. Consider the words of the late E.P. Thompson:
If the law is evidently partial and unjust, then it will mask nothing, legitimize nothing, contribute nothing to any class's hegemony. The essential
precondition for the effectiveness of law, in its function as ideology, is that
it shall display an independence from gross manipulation and shall seem to
be just. It cannot seem to be so without upholding its own logic and criteria of equity; indeed, on occasion, by actually beingjust.
EDWARD P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK Act 263 (1975).
81 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
82 A.V. DicEy, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 24-28
(10th ed. 1959).
83 THOMAS, supra note 37, at 4-5.
84 PETER W. Low ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 34 (1986).
85

Id. at 33-34.
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lature; and second, criminal punishments should be meted out only
for violations of prospectively defined criminal acts.8 6
The contempt power is problematic on both fronts. By its very
nature, the criminal contempt power violates legislative exclusivity in
crime definition; in criminal contempt proceedings, the court itself
defines the proscribed conduct and exercises its punitive powers without meaningful statutory regulation.8 7 Criminal contempt sanctions,
furthermore, are by their very nature retrospective in operation, and
thus violate the second precept as well.88 Recognizing this contravention of the principle of legality, the Supreme Court announced in
United States v. Hudson & Goodwin8 9 that contempt stood out as an
exception to the otherwise extinct power of common-law crime
creation. 90
These concerns are also implicated in civil contempts. Although
compensatory fines are in line with traditional notions of civil remedies, coercive fines and imprisonment have a distinctly criminal cast; a
court imposes such sanctions retrospectively in response to a party's
disobedient act or omission, but they are not calibrated to any specific
damages. Moreover, the contempt context is virtually the only context in which imprisonment, the paradigmatic criminal punishment, is
91
considered a civil remedy.
Related to the legality principle's requirement of legislative exclusivity in crime definition are concerns about the proper allocation of
powers among the branches of government. The contempt power is
in considerable tension with the doctrine of separation of powers, especially when a court exercises its power for violations of its own or86
87
88

Id. at 34.
See Dudley, supranote 2, at 1027-28 n.6.
As discussed infra part II.B, some courts have announced contempt sanctions

before the expected contumacy occurs. Such tactics constitute an exception to the generally retrospective nature of contempt sanctions. The prospective sanction, however, still
violates the legislative exclusivity precept and the separation-of-powers principles underlying it. See discussion infrapart I.B. Furthermore, courts have employed the prospectively
announced sanctions in order to classify determinate penalties as civil contempt sanctions
and thus avoid the procedural protections afforded the criminal contemnor. See discussion
infra part HI.B.
89 11 U.S. 32 (1812).
90 Id. at 33.
9'
Although an individual can be deprived of liberty by civil commitment or quarantine procedures, such sanctions, like coercive contempt, are not considered punitive, but
rather based on a "'treatment' or 'control' model." See generallyLow Er AL., supra note 84,
at 183-91 (contrasting theory and goals of civil commitment with those of the penal law).
Like coercive contempt, civil commitment raises serious due process issues. However,
whether such commitment can be meaningfully distinguished from criminal penalties is an
issue outside the scope of this Note. In the contempt context, it is important to bear in
mind that the Supreme Court has, at least on one occasion, conceded that coercive contempt operates in a punitive manner. See Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S.
418, 441 (1911).
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ders. In such cases, the roles of legislator, adjudicator, prosecutor,
enforcer, and, in civil contempt proceedings, fact finder are conflated
and devolve upon the judge. Montesquieu's classic statement of separation-of-powers doctrine points out the dangers inherent in the collapsing of these roles:
[T]here is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from
the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the
life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control;
for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the
the judge might behave with violence and
executive power,
92
oppression.
When a court imposes contempt sanctions for the violation of its own
injunction, both of Montesquieu's dire scenarios merge; the judgefashioned injunction serves as legislation, which the judge then adjudicates and executes. 93
These rule-of-law concerns are not merely important for the political scientist; they also raise grave practical problems for litigants and
potential litigants. Montesquieu's fears of "violence and oppression"
due to judicial bias remain relevant, particularly in the civil contempt
context where there is no impartial fact finder. Justice Black eloquently made this point in his argument for jury trials in criminal contempt proceedings: "When the responsibilities of lawmaker,
prosecutor, judge, jury and disciplinarian are thrust upon ajudge he
is obviously incapable of holding the scales ofjustice perfectly fair and
of the actrue and reflecting impartially on the guilt or innocence
94
cused. He truly becomes the judge of his own cause."
92 BARON DE MONTESQUmU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAws 152 (Thomas Nugent trans.,
1897). It is worth noting that Alexander Hamilton quoted this passage in his famous defense of the courts as "the least dangerous branch." THE FEDERAIuST No. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). For a modern separation-of-powers-based
critique of the contempt power that borders on the fanatic, see Young v. United States ex
reL Vuitton et Fils S-A-, 481 U.S. 787, 815-25 (1987) (Scalia,J., concurring in thejudgment)
(arguing that, to be consistent with the Constitution's limited grant of implied powers, the
contempt power can only be employed against one who interferes with the business of the
court or when its exercise is necessary for the conduct of the court's business).
93 See Justice Scalia's concurrence in Young
In light of the broad sweep of modem judicial decrees, which have the
binding effect of laws for those to whom they apply, the notion ofjudges in
effect making the laws, prosecuting their violation, and sitting in judgment
of those prosecutions, summons forth ... the prospect of the most tyrannical licentiousness.
481 U.S. at 822 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).

94 Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 199 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting). Ten years
later, the Court came around to Black's way of thinking: "Contemptuous conduct...
often strikes at the most vulnerable and human qualities of a judge's temperament."
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 202 (1968). The Court went on to hold that due process
requires a jury trial in criminal contempt proceedings.
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Also of practical importance is the uncertainty resulting from the
ad hoc, retrospective nature of contempt sanctions. Absent
predefined standards for punishment and-in cases not involving injunctions or prospective penalties-advance warning of what conduct
is proscribed, the potential contemnor has little to guide his or her
conduct. Exacerbating this uncertainty is the indeterminacy of the
civil-criminal distinction itself. Because the distinction that determines appropriate procedure is indefinite, a potential contemnor has
virtually no way of knowing the procedures by which his or her conduct will be tried. 95
Traditional justifications of the contempt power rest on the
power's deep historical roots and on its putative necessity. 96 As
demonstrated above, little doubt exists as to its antiquity, although age
alone provides scant justification for so extraordinary a power.9 7 The
necessity of the contempt power is also questionable. As Professor
Goldfarb argued:
[T]o the lawyer from a non-common-law country the contempt
power is a legal technique which is not only unnecessary to a working legal system, but also violative of basic philosophical approaches
to the relations between government bodies and people. Neither
Latin American nor European civil law legal systems use any device
98
of the nature or proportions of our contempt power.
Whether contempt is necessary or not, it is a power that is so fully
entrenched in Anglo-American law as to be a permanent feature of
the legal landscape. The important question, then, is not whether the
contempt power should exist but rather how to control the uncertainty and abuses endemic to it. The Supreme Court has sought to
curb the contempt power largely through the civil-criminal distinction,9 9 to which this Note now turns.
95

See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 368 (Rutledge, J., dissent-

ing) (The contemnor is "thus placed in continuing dilemma throughout the proceedings
in the trial court concerning which set of procedural rights he is entitled to stand upon.").
96

In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 594-95 (1895) provides a classic example of these twin

justifications. Brushing aside Eugene V. Debs's argument that the Constitution requires a
jury trial in criminal contempt proceedings, the Court stated:
[T]he power of a court to make an order, carries with it the equal power to
punish for disobedience of that order and the inquiry as to the question of
disobedience has been, from time immemorial, the special function of the
court. And this is no technical rule. In order that a court may compel
obedience to its orders it must have the right to inquire whether there has
been any disobedience thereof.
Id.
97 Torture, for instance, also has a considerable pedigree, see generally MICHEL FouCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 3-69 (Alan Sheridin trans., 1979),
but few would justify punitive physical mutilation on such a ground.

98

GOLDFARB,

99

As Professor Dudley explains:

supra note 2, at 1-2.
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II
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CIVIL-CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
DISTINCTION

A.

Supreme Court Cases

The Supreme Court's leading case on the civil-criminal contempt distinction is Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co.10 0 In Gompers,
the Court reversed civil contempt orders against labor leader Samuel
Gompers and two other defendants stemming from their violation of
an injunction prohibiting boycott activity. In the course of a dispute
over working hours, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) declared a boycott of Buck's Stove and Range Co.' 0' The company
sought and received an order enjoining the boycott. 10 2 Gompers and
two other leaders, however, continued to name Buck's Stove in the
AFL newspaper's "Unfair" and "We Don't Patronize" lists.' 0 3 The trial
court found them in contempt and sentenced the three men to fixed
terms of imprisonment.1 0 4 On appeal, the Supreme Court held that
the contempt orders, issued in an equity proceeding, were actually
criminal; as such they required a separate proceeding at law in which
the defendants would have the benefit of the privilege against selfincrimination and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. 05
In reaching this conclusion, the Court enunciated conceptual
principles for distinguishing the two types of contempt in a passage
that has become a mantra in later decisions, reverently intoned but
rarely examined with any critical scrutiny.' 0 6 After acknowledging the
difficulty inherent in the classification of contempts, Justice Lamar
wrote for the Court:
In the absence of meaningful legislative guidance, the Supreme Court
has sought to guard against potential judicial bias and to cabin the power to
adjudicate indirect contempts by imposing protective procedural constraints. The Court's principal vehicle for limiting the judicial contempt
power has been the distinction between civil and criminal contempt.
Dudley, supranote 2, at 1031.
100
221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911). The Court treated the issue in Bessette v. W.B. Conkey
Co., 194 U.S. 324 (1904), but because the case involved the contumacious act of a nonparty, and because the Court limited its holding to the facts of the case, 194 U.S. at 338, the

articulation of the distinction in Bessette is dictum with regard to contempts committed by
litigants.
101
Gompers, 221 U.S. at 420.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 424-25.
105 Id. at 444.
106
See, e.g., Hicks ex ret Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 635 (1988); Shillitani v. United
States, 384 U.S. 364, 369 (1966); United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 297
(1947); In re Power Recovery Sys., Inc., 950 F.2d 798, 802 (1st Cir. 1991).
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It is not the fact of punishment, but rather its character and purpose, that often serve to distinguish between the two classes of cases.
If it is for civil contempt the punishment is remedial, and for the
benefit of the complainant. But if it is for criminal contempt the

10 7
sentence is punitive, to vindicate the authority of the court.
The Court's test for distinguishing the two types of contempt is notable for what it did not address: it did not focus on the conduct itself,
the contemnors' due process rights, or the potential for arbitrary or
biased adjudication. Instead, the Gompers Court chose to base its determination on such vague and slippery concepts as character and
purpose.
In its effort to render these abstract principles concrete, the
Court was driven to garner what it could from the record to anchor its
decision on facts. It began its quest for facts relevant to its "character
and purpose" inquiry by examining the phrasing of the underlying
order. The Court opined that imprisonment for civil contempt is appropriate when the contemnor violates a mandatory order, whereas if
punishment is meted out for the violation of a prohibitory order, the
sanction is criminal. 108 Because Gompers and his colleagues violated
an order worded in prohibitory terms, the Court reasoned that the
only appropriate sanction was a criminal one. 10 9 Tojustify its conclusion that the proceedings were criminal, the Court also looked to the
petition's caption and to the wording of the prayer for relief." 0
What emerges from the Gompers case is not so much a test as a
conceptual potpourri, made up of categories with a great deal of overlap. The Court itself acknowledged that the boundary between remedial and punitive sanctions is blurred: "[I]f the case is civil and the
punishment is purely remedial, there is also a vindication of the
court's authority.""' The Court attempted to reason this difficulty
2
away by maintaining that such effects are "indirect consequences.""
This reasoning, however, is circular; the question of what is an "indirect consequence" of a sanction as opposed to the "purpose" of the
sanction is purely a function of how the sanction has been defined in
the first place. Falling back on the mandatory-prohibitory distinction
is of no help either. As commentators have pointed out, whether an
order's wording falls into one or the other category is not always discernible, and any order can be phrased in either mandatory or pro-

107
108
109
110

Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441.
Id. at 441-42.
Id. at 444-45.

111

Id. at 444.
Id.

112

Id. at 446, 448.
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hibitory terms. 113 The remedial-punitive distinction that Gompers
articulated does not offer airtight categories.
Further undermining the Gompers Court's attempt to draw a
meaningful distinction between civil and criminal contempt was its acknowledgment that contempt sanctions, in both forms, work as punishment. The Court conceded the punitive nature of civil contempt
sanctions: "It is not the fact of punishment but rather its character and
purpose that often serve to distinguish between the two classes of
cases. If it is for civil contempt, the punishment is remedial."' 14 The
Court then went on, rather inconsistently, to say that "[i] mprisonment
in [civil contempt] cases is not inflicted as a punishment, but is intended to be remedial by coercing the defendant to do what he had
refused to do."115
Ultimately, the Gompers principles raised more problems than
they solved. According to Gompers, the distinction between civil and
criminal contempt turns on the character and purpose of the contempt sanction, yet the Court conceded that both civil and criminal
contempt work in a punitive manner. Since, by concession, both types
of contempt have common purposes, how then is a trial court, a reviewing court, or an alleged contemnor to understand the distinction?
Like the Sorceror's Apprentice, the Court would continue to be bedeviled by its creation in Gompers.
In United States v. United Mine Workers," 6 the Supreme Court applied what has charitably been called the "Gompers framework 711 to
contempt fines. In this case, the district court heldJohn L. Lewis and
the United Mine Workers in contempt for violating a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining strikes throughout the coal industry,
which was then controlled by the federal government." 8 Lewis and
the Union argued that the Norris-LaGuardia Act deprived the court of
jurisdiction to enjoin the strike."19 Ruling against the union on its
jurisdictional challenge, the trial court fined Lewis $10,000 and the
Union a staggering $3.5 million. The court levied these fines as lump
sums for both civil and criminal contempt without any differentia113 See, e.g., Moskovitz, supra note 74, at 792-93. Justice Blackmun echoed this criticism
in BagwelL International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. 2552, 2561
(1994); see also Dobbs, supra note 2, at 239-40 (characterizing mandatory-prohibitory dichotomy as a "deviant test").
"14
Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441 (emphasis added).
115 Id. at 442.
116 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
117 International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. 2552, 2567 (1994)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
118 United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 269.
119

Id.
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tion, 20 despite the clear holding in Gompers that civil and criminal
contempts must be tried separately.
The Supreme Court upheld the contempt judgments but modified the sanctions, converting Lewis's fine into one for criminal contempt only and altering the Union's fine by levying a $700,000 fine for
criminal contempt and a $2.8 million fine for civil contempt, to be
imposed if the Union did not comply within five days.' 2 ' The Court
based its rationale for characterizing the $2.8 million fine as civil on
Gompers, resting on the notion that the sanction was conditioned on
future compliance and thus appropriate as a coercive "remedial"
122
measure.
The United Mine Workers opinion further blurred the
civil-criminal contempt distinction in three ways. First, it approved
the use of fines as a means of coercing compliance with court orders
by analogizing such fines to coercive imprisonment. By so doing, the
Court made it possible for courts to set out prospective fine schemes
and then levy fixed fines in subsequent civil, rather than criminal,
contempt proceedings. The United Mine Workers decision thus allowed
courts to punish past conduct with determinate sanctions while avoiding criminal procedural safeguards by simply announcing fines in advance. As explained in Part II.B, several federal courts (and the state
trial court in the Bagwell case) have seized upon this opportunity. Second, despite the clear mandate of Gompers, the Court invited confusion by allowing civil and criminal contempts to be tried in single
proceeding, notwithstanding the different procedures required for
23
each.
Third, the United Mine Workers Court exacerbated the already considerable uncertainties in this area by altering the trial court's sanctions well after the fact and thus saving otherwise unlawful
proceedings. Already, under Gompers, the civil-criminal distinction is
considered a function of the character and purpose of the sanction,
and thus is determined only at the end of the proceedings; under
United Mine Workers, both the nature and the classification of the sanction are indeterminate until ultimate review in the court of last
resort. 12 4
120
121
122
123

Id.
Id. at 305.
Id. at 303.
In a highly perceptive dissent, Justice Rutledge found that this "admixture of civil
and criminal procedures in one" ran afoul not only of the Gompers precedent but also of
the constitutional guarantee of due process. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 362-67 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
124 Presaging much of the modem criticism of the civil-criminal distinction, Justice
Rutledge made this point most eloquently

This case is characteristic of the long-existing confusion concerning contempts and the manner of their trial ...

in that most frequently the ques-
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The Court revisited the civil-criminal distinction in Shillitani v.
United States125 and Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock.12 6 The Shillitani case
throws into high relief the confusion inherent in the Gompers formula,
particularly with respect to the overlap between coercive and punitive
sanctions. In Shillitani, the district court found the defendant in criminal contempt for failing to answer a grand jury's questions and sentenced him to a two-year prison term without employing all of the
requisite criminal procedural protections. 127 Despite its characterization of the sanction as criminal, however, the trial judge made the
sentence conditional: "Should [the defendant] answer those questions before the expiration of said sentence, or the discharge of the
said grand jury, whichever may first occur, the further order of this
court may be made terminating the sentence." 128 The Supreme
Court, reciting both the Gompers "character and purpose" formula and
its mandatory-prohibitory dichotomy, decided that the contempt was
9
in fact civil in nature. 12
Untroubled by both the district court's and the court of appeals'
classification of the contempt as criminal, the Supreme Court found
the purpose of the sanction determinative. 130 The Court emphasized
the mandatory nature of the order (citing the mandatory-prohibitory
test from Gompers) as well as its construction of the sentence as a conditional one, concluding that the sentence was "clearly intended to
operate in a prospective manner-to coerce rather than to punish." 13 1
Having upheld the sanction as civil, the Court nevertheless vacated
the judgment because the civil contempt sanction could not outlive
the possibility of compliance; because the grand jury's term expired
one year before the Court's decision, no further coercive pressure
32
could be exerted.'
However, the conclusion that the district court's intent was "primarily" coercive 3 3 does not follow as clearly as the Court maintained.
The saving "opportunity to purge" was merely a post-hoc appellate
construction of the district judge's ambiguous directive. When sen-

Id. at
125
126
127
128

tion of the character of the proceeding ... is determined at its end in the
stage of review rather than, as it should be and as in my opinion it must be,
at the beginning. And this fact itself illustrates the complete jeopardy in
which rights are placed when the nature of the proceeding remains unknown and unascertainable until the final action on review.
368 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
384 U.S. 364 (1966).
485 U.S. 624 (1988).
Shillitani, 384 U.S. at 365-66.
Id. at 369.

129

Id.

130
131
132
133

Id.
Id. at 369-70.
Id. at 371-72.
Id. at 370.
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tencing the defendant, the trial judge stated that if the defendant
complied, "the further order of the court may be made terminating
the sentence;" 13 4 although the court of appeals construed this statement to grant "an unqualified right to be released," 13 5 the district
judge's use of the word "may" rather than "will" fairly exudes qualification. The Court could have more persuasively reasoned that the determinate nature of the sentence and its duration beyond the period
during which the defendant could purge rendered the sanction
criminal.
In Hicks, the Court was called upon to decide whether a suspended jail sentence with probation conditioned on the defendant's
compliance constituted civil or criminal contempt. 3 6 The Court relied on Gompers, but shied away from assessing the purposes of the
proceedings-which were, the Court noted, "wholly ambiguous" 1 3 7and chose instead to examine the "character of the relief."138 The
Supreme Court declined to determine whether the sanction was civil
or criminal because there was no finding below as to whether the contempt would be purged by compliance, in which case the lower court's
characterization of the sanction as civil could be sustained.
Hicks and Shillitani thus added a new element to the distinction:
the saving "purge clause." The effect of these two decisions was to
augment rather than reduce the indeterminacy of the distinction.
Read together, the cases stand for the proposition that fixed sanctions
can be meted out using only civil procedures so long as the court employs a "purge clause"-regardless of the trial court's own classification, the ambiguity of the proceedings, or the equivocal wording of
the purge clause.
B.

Civil Contempt Fines in the Lower Federal Courts

The lower federal courts have generally employed the characterand-purpose inquiry 39 but have been no more successful than the
Supreme Court in developing clear, dispositive standards for distinguishing contempts. Thus, although the lower courts have employed
the same general formulae, at times emphasizing one or more of the

134

135
136
137

Id. at 366 (emphasis added).
Id. at 369.

485 U.S. 624, 630.
Id. at 638.

138 Id. at 636.
139 See, e.g., In re Dinnan, 625 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. North, 621
F.2d 1255 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denie, 449 U.S. 866 (1980); United States v. Asay, 614 F.2d
655 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Hughey, 571 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1978).
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Supreme Court's standards, no tidy doctrinal lines can be drawn from
140
the cases.
A serious consequence of the lack of clarity in the contempt
arena has been the liberal use of civil contempt proceedings to impose determinate fines. Before Bagwell many lower federal courts
read the Supreme Court's contempt cases to permit contempt fines to
be classified as civil, coercive remedies when the fines are fixed prospectively. The Second Circuit upheld civil contempt fines levied
against abortion clinic demonstrators for their violations of a district
court's TRO in New York State NOW v. Teny (Teny 1).141 The Teny I

plaintiffs sued in state court, obtaining a TRO prohibiting the defendants from obstructing access to New York abortion clinics; after the
defendants removed the case to federal court, the district court continued the TRO and added to the order a provision setting out "coercive sanctions of $25,000 for each day that defendants violated the
TRO."'1 42 The district court subsequently found the defendants in
civil contempt and fined them according to the prospective schedule.
The Second Circuit affirmed; after reciting the "character and purpose" formula, the court said: "The prospectively fixed penalties were
plainly intended to coerce compliance ....

-143 The court read United

Mine Workers and Hicks to authorize determinate civil fines when the
sanction was announced in advance.'4 Judge Cardamone flatly
summed up: "Faced ...with a choice between compliance or non140

Consider, for example, two illustrative cases, one from the Seventh Circuit and one

from the Fifth Circuit. Both cases essentially canvass the same corpus of decisional law, yet
employ radically different analyses. In Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook County, 533
F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 858 (1976), the court gave substantial weight
to the purpose aspect of the Gompers standards, yet rejected the mandatory-prohibitory
test, which also finds support in Gompers. Id. at 348, 349 n.7. The court attempted to
ascertain the plaintiff's purpose by examining, as did the Gompers Court, the pleadings and
the prayer for relief. Id. at 358. Finding neither to be dispositive, the court examined the
"circumstances leading up to the ...filing of the plaintiff's petition." Id. at 350. Because
the plaintiffs sought to enjoin improper election activity shortly before city elections, the
court rather unconvincingly reached "the inescapable conclusion" that the contempts were
intended to be coercive. Id. at 350. The Fifth Circuit addressed the distinction issue in
Lamar Financial Corp. v. Adams, 918 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1990), but found the "key determinant" to be whether the sanction was conditional (and thus civil) or determinate (and thus
criminal). Id. at 566.
141 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990).
142
Id. at 1344.
143 Id. at 1351.
144 Id. This approach was not new to the Second Circuit. In Sunbeam Corp. v. Golden
Rule Appliance Co., 252 F.2d 467, 470 (2d Cir. 1958), the circuit affirmed the district
court's fixing of prospective civil fines. In reaching this conclusion, the majority incorporated Judge Hand's concurrence, 252 F.2d at 470, which read United Mine Workers to authorize "in terrorem" civil fines on the ground that such fines are "imposed only
conditionally and depended upon the contemnor's future conduct." Id. at 472 (Hand, J.,
concurring).
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compliance with the district court's order, defendants chose the latter
course."145
The Second Circuit was not alone in holding that prospectively
fixed fines could operate as civil contempt sanctions; both the Third
and Ninth Circuits have taken the same approach in similar contexts.
In Roe v. Operation Rescue,14 6 the Third Circuit, with startlingly little
discussion (and no case citations), upheld prospective civil fines, reasoning that the trial court "made the contemnors' obligation to pay
these fines contingent on a future violation of its orders. In so doing,
the court obviously was trying to ensure that the contemnors would
not disobey its orders again."' 47 Revisiting the issue the following year
in Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle,148 the Third Circuit upheld this principle. In similar litigation, the Ninth Circuit, citing Terry
, also upheld prospective civil contempt fines. 149
The District Court for the District of Columbia also adopted the
view that prospectively fixed fines could be levied as civil contempt
sanctions. The court first used this approach in United States v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization,150 which arose out of the air
traffic controllers' strike of 1981. The United States obtained a TRO
prohibiting the air traffic controllers from striking in violation of 5
U.S.C. § 7311.151 After the strike commenced, the United States applied to the court for an order to show cause, and the court found the
defendants in civil contempt. The court "imposed an escalating
schedule of fines beginning twenty-four hours after the issuance of the
52
order."'1
As the strike continued, the court assessed fines totaling
$752,000.153 The defendants then moved to vacate the fines, arguing
that they were criminal in nature. 5 4 The court refused to vacate,
stressing the twenty-four hour lag time between the announcement of
the fine schedule and the actual assessment of fines against the union:
"The Court intended the delay... to afford the two defendants the
145
146
147
148

Terry , 886 F.2d at 1351.
919 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1990).
Id. at 869.
939 F.2d 57, 68 (3d Cir. 1991).

149

Aradia Women's Health Ctr. v. Operation Rescue, 929 F.2d 530, 532 (9th Cir.

1991).
150 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2858 (D.D.C. 1982).
151 Id. at 2859. 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1994) reads, in pertinent part, "[a]n individual may
not.., hold a position in the Government of the United States... if he... participates in
a strike, or asserts the right to strike, against the Government of the-United States ... or...
is a member of an organization of employees of the Government of the United States...
that he knows asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States."
152 ProfessionalAir Traffic Controllers, 110 L.R.R.M. at 2859.
153 Id. at 2860.
154 Id.
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opportunity to purge themselves of contempt by complying."155 Thus
the court used the "purge clause" rationale to justify imposing fixed
fines for completed conduct on one day's notice without affording the
15 6
defendants the safeguards of criminal procedure.
More recently, the District Court for the District of Columbia imposed prospective civil fines in the abortion clinic demonstration con1 57
text. In NationalOrganizationfor Women v. OperationRescue (NOWIH),
the court imposed fines based on a prospective fine schedule previously announced by the court. In NOWI, the court had issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from barring access to
abortion clinics. 158 After continued violations of the injunction, the
court issued its first contempt order in which it assessed compensatory
fines and set up a schedule of escalating fines for any further violations. 159 Despite labeling the sanctions as coercive, the court made
the fines payable to the clinics irrespective of any determination of
damages.' 60 In its second contempt proceeding, the court found the
defendants in contempt and assessed a total of $145,000 in noncompensatory civil contempt fines. 161 The court relied principally on the
Gompers mandatory-prohibitory dichotomy in classifying the
sanctions.
A credible application of the Supreme Court's pre-Bagwell contempt classification jurisprudence in the fine context came in Local 28
of Sheet Metal Workers' InternationalAss'n v. EEOC. 62 In this case, the
District Court for the Southern District of New York had enjoined the
union from operating its apprenticeship program in ways that violated
155

Id.

Although the "purge" language suggests the influence of the Hicks-Shiflitani purge
clause requirement, the court cited no cases in its contempt discussion. The court seems
to have been more concerned with what it perceived as the gravity of the contemnors'
conduct than with the legal distinction between civil and criminal contempt. Throughout
the opinion, the court repeatedly emphasized the "flagrant" nature of the defendants' conduct. Near the end of the opinion, the court stated that it "will not exercise its discretion
to vacate the civil contempt fines... because of their highly contumacious conduct." Id. at
2864. In its apparent outrage at the gravity of the defendants' conduct, the court seems to
have lost sight of the fact that the civil-criminal distinction is not a matter ofjudicial discretion hinging on a court's perception of the outrageousness of the contemnor's conduct,
but an important legal distinction that determines what procedures the Constitution
requires.
157 816 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1993), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 37 F.3d 646 (D.C. Cir.
1994).
158 National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue (NOW I), 747 F. Supp. 760, 770
(D.D.C. 1990).
159 National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue (NOW II), 816 F. Supp. 729, 735-36
(D.D.C. 1993), affd in part, vacated in part, 37 F.3d 646 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
160
NOW I, 747 F. Supp. at 772.
161
NOWII, 816 F. Supp. at 736.
162
478 U.S. 421 (1986).
156
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Tide VII. 163 Having found the union in civil contempt, the court, applying the Hicks-Shillitanirequirement that a determinate sentence for
civil contempt must include a purge clause, imposed determinate civil
contempt fines payable into a fund that financed minority access to
the sheet metal trades, but provided that the contemnor union would
be reimbursed if it complied. 6 4 Under this scheme, the union could
recover any of its money remaining in the fund by ceasing to operate
its apprenticeship program to the detriment of non-whites. 165 The
Supreme Court affirmed. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, held
that because of the possibility of (at least partial) reimbursement, "the
sanctions... were clearly designed to coerce compliance... rather
16 6
than to punish petitioners for their contemptuous conduct."
The creative approach taken by the district court in Sheet Metal
Workers, although certainly not available in all contexts, offered a sensible solution within a less than sensible framework. By requiring that
fines be paid into the fund and providing for reimbursement on compliance, the sanction served both remedial and coercive ends. Furthermore, the reimbursement provision gave credibility to the idea
that the fine would be "purged" by compliance.
The abstract and conceptual approach to classifying contempts
offered by Gompers and its progeny has given courts little guidance.
The indeterminate standards based on "nature" and "purpose" have
fostered confusion. When courts have sought to anchor these standards in concrete circumstances, they have determined the
civil-criminal contempt distinction, and hence the appropriate due
process protections due an alleged contemnor, by such crude expedients as examining the caption of the action 167 and the wording of
the complainant's prayer.' 6 8 The indeterminacy of the tests also permitted trial judges to avoid the procedural protections granted to
criminal contemnors by reading the doctrine to allow them to levy
16 9
punitive fines in civil proceedings.

163
164
165
166
167

Id. at 440.

Id. at 442-44.
Id. at 444.
Id.

Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 445-46 (1911); DeParcq v.
United States Dist. Court, 235 F.2d 692, 699 (8th Cir. 1956).
168 Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 43 (1941); Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U.S. 217, 220
(1932). As noted supra part HA, this approach finds support in Gompers.
169
See discussion of Second, Third, and Ninth Circuit cases, supra part ll.B.
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III
UNITED MINE WORKERS V .BAGWELL

A.

Background

The Bag'well litigation arose out of a 1989 strike by the United
Mine Workers Union against two coal companies in southwestern Virginia. 170 Shortly after the strike commenced, the companies sought
and received an injunction in a Virginia state court prohibiting unlawful activity in connection with the strike.' 7' On the companies' motion, the court subsequently modified and strengthened the
injunction; as modified, the injunction prohibited, among other
things, blocking access to the mines, throwing rocks, and placing tirepuncturing devices on roads leading to and from the mines. 17 2 The
injunction also required the Union to place supervisors at picket sites
and to limit the number of picketers at designated sites. 173 As the
strike continued, the trial court held a contempt hearing in which it
set out a prospective schedule of civil fines, varying according to the
nature of the violations.' 74 The trial court announced that the fines
were civil. 175 In a series of subsequent contempt hearings, the trial
court found the Union in civil contempt. The court fined the Union
a total of $64 million for some 400 separate violations of the injunction; $12 million of the fine was payable to the companies and the
remaining $52 million was payable to the Commonwealth of Virginia
and the two counties in which the mines were located. 176 Having classified the sanctions as civil, the court tried the contempts without a
jury.177
The Union appealed the contempt orders. While the Union's
appeals were pending, the parties settled the dispute that gave rise to
the strike, and the parties accordingly moved to vacate the fines and
dismiss the case. 178 The trial court granted the motion and vacated
the fines payable to the companies, but refused to vacate the $52 million fine, all the while maintaining that the fines were civil and coercive.' 7 9 The companies withdrew from the case, but the trial judge,
170 International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. 2552, 2555
(1994).
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174
Id. (The court announced that it would "fine the Union $100,000 for any future
violent breach of the injunction and $20,000 for any future nonviolent infraction.").
175

Id.

176
177

Id. at 2555-56.
Id. at 2555.

Id. at 2556.
Id.; International Union, United Mine Workers v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 402 S.E.2d
899, 901 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
178
179
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determined to collect the fines, appointed John Bagwell as a Special
Commissioner to collect the fines on behalf of the two counties and
the Commonwealth. 8 0
The Virginia Court of Appeals reversed without deciding
whether the fines were civil or criminal; assuming that the fines were
coercive civil ones, the court held that the settlement of the underlying dispute required the contempt sanctions to be set aside.' 8 ' The
Virginia Supreme Court reversed, holding that the settlement of the
case did not moot the contempt proceedings and that the fines levied
according to the prospective schedule were valid civil, coercive remedies.' 82 Citing UnitedMine Workers and the Second and Ninth Circuits'
clinic-demonstration cases, the court reasoned that the trial court's
"clear intent" was to coerce compliance with the injunction, and that
the fines were thus conditional because the Union could have avoided
83
them by obeying the injunction.'
B.

The U.S. Supreme Court Decision

In its appeal to the Supreme Court, the Union made three arguments: (1) the imposition of determinate, noncompensatory fines for
completed acts of disobedience to a prohibitory injunction was a criminal contempt sanction and as such could not have been imposed
without ajury trial and other criminal procedural protections; (2) the
survival of the contempt sanction beyond the settlement of the underlying dispute rendered the sanction criminal and thus constitutionally
defective for want of the requisite procedures; and (3) the fines vio84
lated the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Virginia Supreme Court's
reinstatement of the fines without reaching either the settlement-ofthe-underlying-dispute or the excessive-fine issue. 185 After acknowledging, albeit in understated terms, the difficulties inherent in the
86
civil-criminal distinction as articulated in the Court's prior cases,'
the Court ultimately held that "out-of-court violations of complex in180
181

Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. at 2556.

International Union, United Mine Workers v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 402 S.E.2d 899,
904-05 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
182 Bagwell v. International Union, United Mine Workers, 423 S.E.2d 349, 356-59 (Va.
1992).
183
184

Id. at 357.

Brief for Petitioners at 7, International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell,

114 S. Ct. 2552 (1994) (No. 92-1625).
185 International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. 2552, 2563
(1994).
186 Id. at 2557 ("Although the procedural contours of the two forms of contempt are
well established, the distinguishing characteristics of civil versus criminal contempts are
somewhat less clear.").
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junctions" require criminal procedural protections.' 8 7 Writing for the
Court, Justice Blackmun stated that in such cases, a court "police [s]
...compliance with an entire code of conduct" thus making "disinterested factfinding and even-handed adjudication . . . essential."' 8 8

In so holding, the Court rejected both the respondent's argument
that the prospective fine schedule rendered the fines civil under
United Mine Workers and the petitioner's reliance on the
mandatory-prohibitory distinction gleaned from among Gompers'
many loose ends. 18 9 The Court also held that contempt fines are not
rendered civil simply because a court announces them in advance. 190
Justice Scalia concurred separately. After acknowledging that the
Court's prior cases "employed a variety of not easily reconcilable tests"
for determining the civil-criminal distinction, Justice Scalia expressed
some reservations regarding the use of the Bagwell case, "a case so

extreme on its facts," as a vehicle for announcing which test would
control.' 91 He nevertheless made a strong argument, based on the
putatively changed character of the modem injunction, for requiring
criminal procedural protections when violations of complex injunctions are at issue:
Contemporary courts ....

routinely issue complex decrees which

involve them in extended disputes and place them in continuing
supervisory roles over parties and institutions.... As the scope of
injunctions has expanded, they have lost some of the distinctive features that make enforcement through civil process acceptable. It is
not that the times, or our perceptions of fairness, have changed...
but rather that the modern judicial order is in its relevant essentials
not the same device that in former times could always be enforced
92
by civil contempt.'
187

Id. at 2560-61. Contrary to Professor Mullenix's assertion that the Bagwell opinion

"further complicates this already categorically challenged domain by introducing three
new analytical classifications: direct contempt, indirect contempt and 'contempts of complex injunctions,'" Linda S. Mullenix, Court Sets New Rules in Key Areas, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 15,
1994, at C7, the direct-indirect distinction has been a staple of contemptjurisprudence for
centuries. The distinction is featured in the first American treatise on the subject. See
STEWART RAPALJE, A TRE.ATxSE ON CoNrEMPT 26-27 (1884). Goldfarb noted that differentia-

tion between direct and indirect contempts determined procedural protections before the
Eighteenth Century. GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 15-16. Indeed, Sir John Fox, in his exhaustive history of the contempt power, found voluminous authority for the proposition
that observance of the substance of the distinction, if not the name, has medical roots.
Since the reign of Edward I (1272-1307), contempts committed in the face of the court
were tried summarily, while those committed away from the court's presence were "only
punishable after trial in the ordinary course of law." Fox, supra note 41, at 50-52.
188 Bagwe, 114 S. Ct. at 2562.
189
190

Id. at 2561-62.
Id. at 2562.

191
192

Id. at 2563 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 2565 (Scalia, J., concurring).

1995]

NOTE-CVIL AND CRIMINAL CONTEMPT

211

Justice Scalia closed, observing the need for line-drawing decisions to
decide "which modem injunctions sufficiently resemble their historical namesakes to warrant the same extraordinary means of
enforcement."19 3
Justice Ginsburg, joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist, concurred in
all but Part II.B of the opinion (holding that indirect contempts of
complex injunctions merit criminal procedures) and concurred in the
judgment. Justice Ginsburg's concurrence maintained that despite
the considerable criticism launched against the Gompers formulae,
"the Court has repeatedly relied upon Gompers' delineation of the distinction."1 9 4 The concurrence offered two grounds to support the
classification of the contempt proceedings as criminal. The concurrers first simply rejected Bagwell's argument that the conditional and
coercive nature of the sanctions rendered them civil, without offering
a test for finding otherwise. Second, the concurrers determined that
the survival of the contempt fines past the settlement of the underly195
ing dispute rendered the fines criminal penalties.
C.

The Bagwell Rule, Rationale, and Application
1. Primary Holding: Indirect Contempts of Complex Injunctions

Although Bagwell preserved the Court's precedents on the
civil-criminal contempt distinction, 196 the rule that emerges from the
case, and the methodology by which the Court arrived at that rule,
both represent a departure from prior decisions. The Bagwell holding
on violations of complex injunctions is the first determinate rule the
Court has issued on the civil-criminal contempt distinction, an area
historically notable for loose standards. The Bagwell Court's approach
focuses on the circumstances of a case, not the nature or purpose of
the sanction. Rather than indulging in abstract musings on purpose
or focusing unduly on the form of the proceedings to determine the
character of the sanction after the fact, the Court instead examined
the interests at stake in the contempt proceedings with particular emphasis on the degree of procedural safeguards necessary for accurate
fact finding. Thus the Court utilized a balancing approach to fashion
a rule that is readily applicable to a class of cases.
Part II.B of the Bagwell opinion suggests that the procedural law
of contempt, both civil and criminal, is the product of a balancing of
interests, thus connecting the Court's procedural contempt jurisprudence with its analysis of the civil-criminal contempt distinction. After noting that the contempt power is justified on the basis of
193
194

Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 2566 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

195

Id. at 2567 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
See infra part III.C.2.

196
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necessity but that it is also "liable to abuse," Justice Blackmun went on
to say: "Our jurisprudence in the contempt area has attempted to
balance the competing concerns of necessity and potential arbitrariness by allowing a relatively unencumbered contempt power when its
exercise is most essential, and requiring greater procedural protec19 7
tions when other considerations come into play."
Thus "necessity" is implicated when an individual obstructs judicial proceedings in the presence of the court, as in the case of a recalcitrant witness. 198 In such instances of direct contempt, the court's
interests are high, and the risk of error is low. Accordingly, summary
civil procedures are appropriate, provided that the punishment is not
serious. 199 Similarly, the Court reasoned that "indirect contempts involving discrete, readily ascertainable acts properly may be adjudicated through civil proceedings."2 °°
For contempts on the other side of the spectrum, the Bagwell
Court fashioned a categorical rule:
Contempts involving out-of-court disobedience to complex injunctions often require elaborate and reliable fact finding.... Such contempts do not obstruct the court's ability to adjudicate the
proceedings before it, and the risk of erroneous deprivation from
the lack of a neutral factfinder may be substantial. Under these circumstances, criminal procedural protections ...are both necessary

and appropriate to protect the due process rights of parties and pre20 1
vent the arbitrary exercise of judicial power.
By focusing on the competing interests involved in contempt adjudication generally and the fact finding demands particular to a specific
contempt context, the Court employed a far more pragmatic approach to the civil-criminal contempt distinction. In so doing, the
Court fashioned a categorical rule that injects some determinacy--at
least with regard to the cases that fall within its holding-into an area
of the law previously dominated by indeterminate standards.
The Bagwell opinion also differs from Gompers and its progeny by
bringing concerns about due process and the rule-of-law-problems inherent in the contempt power into the distinction analysis. 20 2 The
Court's retrospective reading of its prior cases as weighing due process
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BagweH, 114 S. Ct. at 2559.
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Id. at 2559-60.

199
200

Id. at 2560.

Id.

Id. at 2560-61 (citation omitted).
Cf.Dudley, supra note 2, at 1081-96 (arguing for a cost-benefit balancing approach
to the allocation of procedural protections in contempt based on Matthews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
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concerns against the necessity justification for the contempt power 20 3
reflects a shift in analytic approach. The Court's acknowledgment of
the contempt power's inherent potential for abuse 20 4 also brought
rule-of-law concerns to the fore for the first time in a contempt classification case.
The Court's subsidiary holding, that contempt sanctions are not
rendered civil simply because a court announces them in advance, appears to have been motivated by unease with some courts' cavalier
imposition of civil contempt fines. The Court expressed its concern
regarding such practices at the end of Part II.A of the opinion: "Lower
federal courts and state courts such as the trial court here... have
relied on United Mine Workers to authorize a relatively unlimited judi'205 Withcial power to impose noncompensatory civil contempt fines.
out naming names, the Court here is addressing the approach to civil
contempt fines taken by the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits and by
206
the District Court for the District of Columbia.
The Court flatly rejected the idea that a court can avoid the procedural protections required for criminal contempt adjudication
merely by announcing punitive sanctions in advance:
[T] he fact that the trial court announced the fines before the contumacy, rather than after the fact, does not in itselfjustify [the] con-

clusion that the fines are civil or meaningfully distinguish these
penalties from the ordinary criminal law.... The union's ability to

avoid the contempt fines was indistinguishable from the ability of
any ordinary citizen to avoid a criminal sanction by conforming his
20 7
behavior to the law.
The Court's categorical ruling that disobedience of a complex
injunction merits criminal procedural protections responds well to
these concerns; as noted above, the rule-of-law concerns are most urgent when judges adjudicate and enforce commands of their own
making.2 0 8 Indeed, the Bagwell case provided a compelling example
of the dangers inherent in a relatively unlimited contempt power.
The enormity of the fines thatJudge McGlothlin imposed raises ques203 Bagwel 114 S. Ct. at 2559. This is a generous reading of the prior case law.
Although solicitude for the due process rights of a contemnor figured prominently in the
cases that required the use of criminal procedures in criminal contempt proceedings, e.g.,
Bloom v. Illinois, 891 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1968), such concerns seemed of little moment in

the decisions focusing on classification alone, e.g., Hicks ex reL Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S.
624 (1988); United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). In the latter class
of cases, the due process protections available followed from the application of the distinction formulae, rather than informing the distinction analysis itself.
204 Bagwell 114 S. Ct. at 2559.
205

Id.

206
207
208

See supra part II.B.
Bagwel, 114 S. Ct. at 2562.
See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
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tions of propriety and biased adjudication. According to organized
labor representatives, the fines would have been enough to bankrupt
the Union. 20 9 United Mine Workers' president Richard Trumka saw
the fine as an effort to destroy the Union. 2 10 Furthermore, Judge
McGlothlin had refused to recuse himself from the case, despite the
fact that his father, an incumbent in the Virginia state legislature, had
president
just been defeated by write-in candidate Jackie Stump, the
21 1
strike.
the
by
polarized
election
an
of the UMW Local, in
Given the immensity of the fines, Judge McGlothlin's apparently
conflicted interests, and his determination to collect the fines despite
the settlement of the underlying dispute, the inference of judicial
bias, and with it a recollection of courts' historical hostility to organized labor, 2 12 is difficult to resist. Thus Bagwell was an apt case in
which to advance rule-of-law concerns as a part of contempt-distinction analysis.
The Bagwell opinion's approach represents a functionalist,
checks-and-balances response to the separation-of-powers problems
raised by the contempt power.2 13 A jury trial in situations like that
presented in Bagwell provides a needed check against arbitrary or interested judicial power.2 14 A jury trial can help curb the contempt
power without abandoning contempt as a means of enforcing injunctions or challenging the legitimacy of structural injunctions in public

209 John P. Furfaro & Maury B. Josephson, Supreme CourtReview, N.Y. LJ., Aug. 5, 1994,
at 3. The article also characterized the sanction as "one of the largest ever imposed." Id.
210 Supreme Court Votes Unanimously to Vacate $52 Million ContemptFineAgainst Mine Workers, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), July 1, 1994, at A-1.
Va. Judge FinesMiners Union $33.4 Millionfor Strike Action, WASH. PosT, Dec. 9, 1989,
211
at B2.
212 See supra notes 66-77 and accompanying text. Indeed the strike-breaking labor injunction in the federal courts is not a purely historical curiosity. During the Eastern Airlines strike of 1989, for example, the airline, after filing for Chapter 11, successfully
applied to the bankruptcy court for an injunction against strike activities, despite the apparently clear prohibitions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 108
B.R. 901, 937-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), vacated sub nom. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Eastern Airlines, 121 B.R. 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affd, 923 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.
1991). Although the district court subsequently vacated the injunction on Norris-LaGuardia grounds, this relief did not come until nearly a year after the injunction issued. Id.
Because the efficacy of strikes is time-sensitive, such injunctions, even after appellate correction, can irremediably damage a union's efforts; see, e.g., Elsinore Assocs. v. Local 54,
Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Int'l Union, 820 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1987) (similar facts, different industrial context). The author thanks Bruce W. Simon, Esq. for bringing these cases to his attention.
213 See Fiss, supranote 75, at 32 ("Traditional separation of powers doctrine... does
not require that the differentiation be along formal as opposed to functional lines .... ").
214 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 10 (1957) ("Trial by jury in a court of law and in
accordance with traditional modes of procedure after an indictment by grand jury has
served and remains one of our most vital barriers to governmental arbitrariness.").
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law litigation, as the formalist approach to separation of powers would
dictate.2 15
The holding responds to the fact finding difficulties inherent in
such circumstances, that is, the fact that the actions at issue occur
away from the court's presence and can also be numerous. Indeed, in
the course of deciding contempt issues in the context of public law
adjudication, a labor dispute, or mass civil disobedience, the fact
finder must not only determine whether violations have occurred, but
often must also determine whether an entity, like the union in Bagwel,
was truly responsible. Submitting such issues to an impartial body,
with full criminal procedural protections, is an appropriate practical,
as well as political, safeguard in such situations.
The jury also serves important democratic values, intertwined
with its function as a deliberative fact finder.2 16 It not only guards
against error, but, as Professor Dudley explains, "allows a microcosm
of the community to stand between the defendant and what the microcosm perceives as unduly harsh law enforcement." 217 Hence, it is
not only the problem of fact finding reliability that Bagwelts jury requirement helps to ameliorate, but also the limitless sanctioning authority that a court has once the fact of disobedience is found. The
added precaution of a jury trial can limit the court's broad sanctioning authority as a practical matter, for ajudge will have to assess sanctions with the knowledge that ajury must vote unanimously to impose
them.2 1 8 This check should not only help keep sanctions within the
215 Justice Scalia would limit the contempt power exclusively to the enforcement of
orders either involving the litigation process or judicial self-defense. See Young v. United
States ex reL Vuitton et Fils SA, 481 U.S. 787, 821 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment). For an argument against judges' involvement in the business of vindicating
public rights in general, see Lon L. Fuller, The Formsand Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L.
REV. 353 393-404 (1978). It is this Note's position that adherence to the rule of law does
not require abandonment of public law adjudication.
216 See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 215-16 (1958) (Black,J., dissenting) ("The
jury injects a democratic element into the law."); ALaxis DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEsocRACv IN
AMERICA (Henry Reeve trans., 1988); V. HANs & N. VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 249 (1986)
("In brief, the political functions of the jury are not to be ignored. They coexist with the
fact-finding functions and should be considered in judging the jury's role in society.").
217 Dudley, supra note 2, at 1085.
218 In their defense of the constitutionality of the Clayton Act's provisions limiting the
availability of the injunction in labor disputes and requiring jury trials for contempts of
injunctions issued in labor disputes, Frankfurter and Landis made the following observation, equally forceful as a defense of Bagwells constitutional mandate:
[Tihe jury is the indispensable element in the popular vindication of the
criminal law. Since the restraining order of a single judge may bind large
numbers, we are dealing with law enforcement en masse. Certainly Congress
may be of the opinion that under these circumstances protection against
abuse and the necessary confidence in the processes of the lower Federal
courts may only be had if a jury cooperates with the judge in finding the
facts on which punishment is based.
Frankfurter & Landis, supranote 50, at 1054 (citation omitted).
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bounds of reason, giving effect to the Court's Anderson v. Dunn dictum
that contempt power is to be confined to "the least possible power
adequate to the end proposed, 2 1 9 but also perform a legitimizing
220
function by allowing a jury to pass on liability.
The overall analytic method of Bagwell works a salutary change as
well. The Bagwell inquiry looks to circumstances that are relatively
easy to identify at the beginning of the process rather than at the end:
the complexity of the injunction and the location of the allegedly disobedient acts. In addition to according alleged contemnors of complex injunctions the procedural protection of the criminal law, then,
the Bagwell decision clears up some of the confusion inherent in the
civil-criminal contempt distinction, at least with respect to cases that
fall within its holding, by limiting the use of civil contempt to enforce
injunctions.
As Justice Blackmun's opinion conceded, the new rule "imposes
some procedural burdens on courts' ability to sanction widespread,
indirect contempts of complex injunctions," 22 1 but the decision
should also reduce much wrangling over the civil-criminal contempt
distinction in the long run. With the advent of a relatively clear, intelligible and readily applicable rule, extensive litigation over the distinction in public law and other complex adjudication should be reduced.
It is true, asJustice Scalia pointed out,222 that future courts will have to
decide the line between those injunctions that are sufficiently complex to fall within Bagwell ambit, but as the discussion below indicates,
2 23
some courts have already begun to outline the contours of the rule.
2.

Bagwell and the Civil-CriminalDistinction

The Bagwell opinion, while announcing a sweeping new rule, also
engaged in a Herculean effort at reconciling the Court's prior cases,
both inter se and with the opinion itself. This heroic attempt to harmonize the cases, however, leaves some tensions and inconsistencies.
As noted above, the opinion leaves intact summary process for
petty, direct contempts and civil procedures for compensatory con219 Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 230-31 (1821).
220 In his eloquent and scholarly plea forjury trials in criminal contempt cases, Justice
Black stated: "[The democratic element ofjury trial] is vital to the effective administration
of criminal justice, not only in safeguarding the rights of the accused, but in encouraging

popular acceptance of the laws and the necessary general acquiescence in their application." Green, 56 U.S. 215-16 (Black,J., dissenting); see also The Supreme Court-LeadingCases,
108 HAxv. L. Riv. 139, 209 (1994) (suggesting that Bagwe/!sjury requirement "serves ...as
a validator of the enforcement of the injunction").
221
BagweI, 114 S. Ct. at 2563.

222

Id. at 2565 (Scalia, J., concurring).

223

See infra part 1I.C.3. But see The Supreme Court-LeadingCases, supranote 220, at 207

(criticizing the Bagwell decision for its "failure to articulate clear standards for its complexity test").
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tempt. Civil contempt procedures also still apply to indirect contempt
when a court is trying "to police the litigation process," 224 or to deal
with disobedience to orders "involving discrete, readily ascertainable
acts, such as turning over a key or pay[ing] ajudgment."225 Such contempts can still be sanctioned by coercive imprisonment or coercive
daily fines. 22 6 Bagwell dealt with fixed, prospective fines levied on a
per-violation basis, rather than daily fines. Consequently, the opinion
leaves the status of coercive daily fines in complex injunction cases
unclear. The Court's reasoning certainly applies to such fines, and
the rule that the Court announced does not carve out an exception
for coercive daily fines. The reach of Bagwell's holding is, however, in
tension with the pains the Court took to distinguish the fines that the
Virginia trial judge had levied from per diem fines as well as from
suspended ones. 22 7 But because the Court's primary concern-the reliability of the fact finding process-does not evaporate by virtue of
the fact that the sanction is a daily fine, or for that matter daily imprisonment, the opinion is best understood to require jury trials on
Bagwell-type facts, irrespective of the form of the sanction.
A similar tension is evident in the Court's treatment of suspended
fines. The Court managed to rescue the United Mine Workers case as
precedent by distinguishing prospective, determinate fines as set forth
by the Virginia trial court from the "suspended" fine that the Supreme
Court fashioned in United Mine Workers.228 Despite its acknowledgement that the analogy between suspended fines and coercive imprisonment is "less comfortable" than that between daily fines and civil
incarceration,2 2 9 the Bagwell Court nonetheless reconciled United Mine
Workers with its holding.
The majority reasoned that "conduct required of the union [in
United Mine Workers] ... was relatively discrete,"28 0 thus placing the
earlier opinion squarely within the category of "indirect contempts involving discrete, readily ascertainable acts" created by BagwelL2 3x In its
retrospective harmonization of the case law, the Court also viewed the
224 Bagwel, 114 S. Ct. at 2560. Civil contempt makes much sense in this area, not only
because, as the Court notes, the interests on the side of the judicial process are weighty,
but also because "litigation process" orders-such as those relating to discovery-are not
meant to be appealable orders. To make such orders enforceable only through criminal
contempt would, in effect, make discovery orders appealable, because criminal contempt
judgments are immediately appealable while civil contempt judgments cannot be appealed
until the controversy in which the contempt arose is reduced to a finaIjudgment. See supra
note 24 and accompanying text.
225
Id.
226 Id.
227
228
229
230
231

Id. at 2562.
Id.
Id. at 2558.
Id. at 2558 n.4.
Id. at 2560.
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United Mine Workers opinion through the lens of the Court's later reasoning in Hicks, explaining that in the former case, the union had an
opportunity to purge through compliance with the order: "[i]n light
of this purge clause" the sanction could be deemed coercive and
civil. 232 Thus, as with daily fines, Bagwell should be read to require
jury trials in complex injunction cases where the sanction is a suspended fine.
In its equivocal attitude toward the civil fine aspect of UnitedMine
Workers, however, the Court weakened its disapproval of prospective,
determinate civil fines. The $2.8 million civil fine in UnitedMine Workers was nothing if not a prospective, determinate fine. Justice Black's
comment on suspended civil contempt sentences applies with equal
force to the suspended fines: "[such sentencing] seems to represent a
present adjudication of guilt for a crime to be committed in the future."233 Given that Hicks held that the mere suspension of a sentence
without an opportunity to purge does not render a sanction civil,
there is no good reason to continue to hold that suspended fines can
so operate. 23 4 In practical terms, there is no difference between a
court establishing a prospective fine schedule for future violations of
an injunction and a court imposing suspended fines conditioned on a
party's future compliance with an injunction. Consequently, serious,
prospective, indirect contempt fines should be considered criminal
sanctions, irrespective of the complexity of the injunction.
Finally, and most importantly, the concerns about the reliability
of the fact finder and the rights of alleged contemnors that Bagwell so
powerfully articulates are applicable well beyond the cases within its
ambit. 23 5 The possibility of erroneous deprivation from judicial bias
can be acute in noncomplex-injunction cases as well. Bagwell still allows civil contempt sanctions to be meted out absent a jury trial provided the allegedly violated order is noncomplex; as noted above, the
sanctions that can flow from an adjudication of civil contempt are po232
Id. at 2558-59. It bears noting that the United Mine Workers opinion nowhere mentioned a purge clause as such and that the opportunity to purge was simply the opportunity
to comply with the order. This reasoning is rejected by the Court when the fine is labeled
a "fixed, determinate retrospective criminal fine[ ],"leaving the contemnor "no opportunity to purge once imposed." Id. at 2562. Query whether there is any real distinction here;
certainly once the initially suspended fine is imposed, the contemnor has no chance to
avoid payment. Cf Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421
(1986) (upholding prospective fine where the contemnor union had an opportunity to
recoup some of its fine upon compliance).
233 Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507, 515 (1960) (Black, J.,dissenting).
234
In fairness, it bears noting that the majority did display some unease with civil "suspended" fines and noted the tension with Hicks by way of a "but see" reference. Bagwell
114 S.Ct. at 2558. The Court, however, would have done well to overrule this aspect of
United Mine Workers overfly.
235
See The Supreme Court-LeadingCases, supranote 220, at 206 (stating that the BagweU
rule is "underinclusive").
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tentially limitless. The risks a defendant faces from a biased fact
finder are thus enormous and distressingly difficult to predict given
the wide latitude that judges have in fashioning sanctions. 23 6 "It
would be no overstatement," wrote Justice Black in a dissent that was
later vindicated, "to say that the offense with the most illdefined and
elastic contours in our law is now punished by the harshest procedures known to that law." 23 7 Furthermore, the simple injunction case

often raises complex issues. Although, as the Court suggests, fact finding may be simpler in some noncomplex injunction cases, the adjudication of a support-order violation, for instance, (indisputably a
simple injunction case) involves not only a finding of nonpayment,
but also a finding of ability to pay. Such issues do not necessarily lend
themselves to determination by a judge. The risk to the defendant
from erroneous adjudication due to judicial bias-indefinite imprisonment for failing to pay a judgment the defendant cannot afford to
paym-is no less weighty in such cases than the risk of bias in complex
injunction cases.
3. Lower Courts"Applications of Bagwell
The Bagwell opinion has sent a clear message to judges to refrain
from the casual imposition of substantial fines through civil contempt
proceedings. On the day the Court decided Bagwell it also reversed
the Second Circuit's affirmance of prospective civil fines in Tery land
remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the Bagwell decision.23 8 On remand, the Second Circuit, in a per curiam opinion,

vacated the $500,000 civil fines.23 9 After extensively quoting both
Bagwell holdings, the court determined that the fines, imposed without a jury trial, were issued for out-of-court violations of an injunction
2 40
of sufficient complexity to bring it within the Court's mandate.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has also
paid heed to the Bagwell decision. After the Court's decision in
Bagwell the NOW v. OperationRescue2 41 litigation reached the appeals
236
The Morgan case, discussed supranote 17, starkly illustrates this potential. Indeed
cases such as Morgan call into serious question the efficacy of such coercive sanctions to
accomplish compliance rather than simply retribution. See generallyBeres, supranote 17, at
724 (arguing that the "rational contemnor" either complies immediately or not at all).
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Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 200 (Black, J., dissenting).
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Pearson v. Planned Parenthood Margaret Sanger Clinic, 114 S. Ct. 2776 (1994).
New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry (Terry H), 41 F.3d 794 (2d Cir.
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1994).
Id. at 796-97.
National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue [NOW I], 747 F. Supp. 772 (D.D.C.
1990); National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue [NOW II], 816 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C.
1993). The facts of these cases are set forth above. See supratext accompanying notes 15861.
240
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court. In the appellate opinion, NOW11,242 the court upheld the district court's first contempt order, which had assessed compensatory
fines against Operation Rescue, but vacated the noncompensatory
fines that the trial court had levied pursuant to a prospective fine
43
schedule in its second contempt order.2
In so doing, the court applied the Bagwell opinion with circumspection, finding that the contempts "fall into that broad category...
involving out-of-court disobedience to complex injunctions." 244 "In
these circumstances," the court went on, "the protections of criminal
procedure are necessary under the principles enunciated in
Bagwell."245 The court allowed that "the injunction here may be somewhat less complex than that in Bagwell .....
But on a scale of complexity ranging from simple affirmative acts . ..

to highly complex

Bagwell-type prohibitory injunctions barring broad classes of illegal
acts ... the out-of-court acts prohibited by the court's order here fall
closer to the Bagwell end of the spectrum."2 46
Both Terry Hand NOWl ldemonstrate the relative ease with which
the Bagwell principles can be applied to a case. Rather than attempting to divine the purposes for which contempt sanctions are meted
out, the courts need only determine whether an injunction is a complex one, "akin to an entire code of conduct, '24 7 and whether the
contemptuous acts were committed in the court's presence in order
to ascertain the appropriate procedures the court should apply. The
Operation Rescue H court in fact had copious evidence of the complexity of the fact finding demands involved in the contempt proceedings
at issue: "Indeed," the court stated, "the district court required ten
pages of opinion just to summarize the findings of fact upon which
248
these contempt citations were based."
IV
A NEW

PARADIGM?

2 49
History... is a nightmarefrom which I am trying to awake.

-James Joyce
National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 37 F.3d 646 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
Id. at 660-61.
244 Id. at 661.
245 Id.
246
Id. Unfortunately, as the passage above demonstrates, the mandatory-prohibitory
analysis dies hard despite the Bagwell opinion's disapproval of it as a test.
247
Teny H, 41 F.3d 794, 797 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Bagwell 114 S. Ct. at 2562).
248
NOW I, 37 F.3d at 661.
249 JAMES JOYCE, ULYSSES 28 (Hans W. Gabler ed., 1986).
242
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According to Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Bagwell, it is
the nature of the injunction that has changed, not the times nor our
notions of fairness. 250 Consequently, Justice Scalia reasons, heightened procedures are appropriate to tame those decrees that do not
"resemble their historical namesakes," and he assures us that "a careful examination of historical practice will ultimately yield an
answer."25 1
Such an examination, however, uncovers the dark history of the
labor injunction, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries' "sweeping"
253
decree 252 and the liberal use of the summary contempt power.
Hence it is difficult to see the "sweeping" decree as an entirely new
phenomenon 25 4 or the use of criminal procedures for violations of
such decrees as anything but a departure-albeit a necessary and ar2 55
guably constitutionally compelled one-from historical practice.
The Bagwell opinion can thus be read as an attempt to deal with
this history, to fashion a contemporary approach to correct the anachronisms with which contempt doctrine is riddled. A contempt power
unlimited by the procedural safeguards that, since the criminal procedure revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, define our current model of
procedural fairness, is truly an anomaly. As an adjunct of monarchy,
the contempt power fit the dominant political-legal paradigm of an
absolutist age. Justice Wilmot, author of the dictum that brought summary procedures to indirect contempts, captured this understanding
250 Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. at 2565 (Scalia, J., concurring).
251
Id. at 2563, 2565 (Scalia, J., concurring).
252 For two archetypal examples of the labor injunction, see Frankfurter & Landis,
supra note 50, at 1101-13 app. II (comparing the texts of the injunction that gave rise to the
Debs case and the "Wilkerson restraining order" from the Railroad Shopmen's strike of
1922. See United States v. Ry. Employees, Dep't of AFL, 283 Fed. 479 (N.D. Ill. 1922).
253
See discussion supraPart II.
254 In 1923, a federal judge reported:
During the 30 years that courts have been dealing with strikes by means of
injunctions, these orders have steadily grown in length, complexity and the
vehemence of their rhetoric. They are full of the rich vocabulary of synonyms which is a part of our English language. They are also replete with
superlative words and the superlative phrases of which the legal mind is
fond. The result is that such writs have steadily become more and more
complex and prolix.
Great N. Ry. v. Brosseau, 286 F. 414, 415 (D.N.D. 1923). In 1924, Frankfurter and Landis
reported: "A detailed study of the terms of the injunctions in the Federal courts in industrial disputes, during the last thirty years, will show a steady extension from carefully limited injunctions in the earlier days to sweeping orders granted almost pro forma."
Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 50, at 1057 n.171.
255 Justice Scalia may be looking to the eighteenth century for his golden age of the
simple injunction when, by implication, procedures were appropriate to the fact finding
demands facing courts. But it should be remembered that it was in the eighteenth century
that the English courts expanded the scope of the summary contempt power to embrace
indirect as well as direct contempts. See Fox, supra note 41; Frankfurter & Landis, supra
note 50, at 1046.
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of the contempt power: "[T]he Principle upon which Attachments
issue for Libels upon Courts, is of a more enlarged and important
-256 But as
nature,-it is to keep a blaze of Glory around them ...
this
passage,
queried,
"Can it
Frankfurter and Landis, commenting on
be that 'the blaze of Glory' meet for Tory judges of George III is to be
25 7
kept forever burning by the Constitution of the United States?"
Answering this question in the negative, the Supreme Court began to look at contempt differently in Bloom v. Illinois, and Bagwell
follows Bloom's due process logic, applying it to the classification of
contempt. Bagwell thus represents a shift in analysis that can serve as a
paradigm for analyzing other categories of contempt. By reexamining
coercive contempt and other contempt contexts using Bagwells due
process and separation-of-powers predicates, the Court can fulfill the
decision's potential to be the new paradigm by which contempt is understood, one that brings the contempt power in line with contemporary notions of procedural fairness.
CONCLUSION

The contempt power, although widely believed to be necessary to
the functioning of our judicial system, is an extraordinary one. Because of the magnitude ofjudicial contempt authority and its uneasy
position in a system that purports to conform to the rule of law and to
a model of procedural fairness, the regulation of this power is of vital
importance. Employing a characteristically process-based approach,
the Supreme Court sought to reign in the scope of the power by guaranteeing criminal procedural protections in criminal contempt
proceedings.
With this development, the distinction between civil and criminal
contempt assumed greater importance, for the classification of contempts became the means of allocating procedural protections rather
than a doctrinal technicality. Unfortunately, however, the Court's
civil-criminal distinction jurisprudence adhered to the overly conceptualized analysis of the Gompers decision. At best, the Gompers formula
was confusing and at worst it allowed courts to circumvent the increased procedural protections by manipulating the distinction.
The Court's decision in Bagwell helped further the goal of procedural fairness that the Court sought to achieve by according alleged
contemnors criminal procedural protections in cases like Bloom.
Although Bagwell did not effect a root-and-branch overhaul of contempt doctrine, it can serve as a first step toward rationalizing the con256

SirJohn Eardley Wilmot, NOTES OF OPINIONS AND JUDGMENTS 270 (1802), quoted in

Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 50, at 1048.
257 Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 50, at 1048.
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tempt process. In the short term, the decision should help to curb the
awesome power of judges by providing safeguards and enforcement
legitimacy in litigation over public rights, labor disputes, and mass
civil disobedience.
In Bagwell, the Court struck the proper balance with regard to the
class of contempts that the opinion embraces. Rather than reasoning
backward by inquiring into the purposes sought by the contempt proceedings and thereby determining what constitutional procedures attach, the Court in Bagwell properly reversed the inquiry: It asked what
procedures are appropriate in cases of the kind before it and determined the classification of the contempt sanction by its resolution of
this important question. By showing solicitude for the due process
rights of alleged contemnors, the Court has done much to further the
interest of vindicating courts' authority in a broad sense. As Justice
White stated in Bloom, in a passage that Justice Blackmun invoked in
his peroration: "Genuine respect, which alone can lend true dignity
to the judicial establishment, will be engendered, not by the fear of
unlimited authority, but by the firm administration of the law through
those institutionalized procedures which have been worked out over
258
the centuries."
Philip A. Hostak
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Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 208 (1968).

